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ABSTRACT
Must we choose between the benefits of cooperative use of scarce
resources and our liberal commitments to autonomy and exit? No. Well-tailored
law can mediate between community and liberty, between commons and private
property. Our theory of the liberal commons provides a framework to reconcile
these seemingly-contradictory moral imperatives and analytic categories. In our
definition, an institution succeeds as a liberal commons when it enables a limited
group of people to capture the economic and social benefits from cooperation,
while also ensuring autonomy to individuals through a secure right to exit. This
Article shows how current theories and categories obscure the most difficult
tradeoffs in managing commons resources; then details our liberal commons
model comprising the decision-making spheres of individual dominion,
democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit; and finally presents
a case study to show how our approach can enrich legal and social inquiry.
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THE LIBERAL COMMONS
Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller*
INTRODUCTION
Following the Civil War, black Americans began acquiring land in
earnest; by the turn of the century almost a million black families owned farms.
Since then, black rural landownership has dropped by more than 98 percent and
continues in rapid decline – there are now fewer than 5,000 black-operated
farms left in America.1 Scholars have offered partial explanations in the
consolidation of inefficient small farms and intense racial discrimination in farm
lending. However, even if these factors were set aside, the unintended effects
of old-fashioned American property law may have led to the same outcome.
Because black farmers often did not make wills, their heirs took the land as coowners. Over generations, co-owners multiplied, the farms became
unmanageable, and the land was partitioned and sold, a seemingly inevitable
“tragedy of the commons” in which too many owners waste a common
resource.2 Black rural landownership may seem a dusty topic, peopled with
hardscrabble tales of property past. Consider, though, the daunting possibility
that property future – think biomedical research, post-apartheid restitution,
hybrid residential associations, perhaps cyberspace – may have the same analytic

*

Visiting Professor and Professor, respectively, at the University of Michigan Law
School. Thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar, Bob Ellickson, Jeff Gordon, Sharon Hannes, Rob
Howse, Rick Hills, Sandy Kedar, Jim Krier, Jeff Lehman, Rick Lempert, Paul Mahoney, Tali
Margalit, Rick Pildes, Carol Rose, Bill Simon and to many generous colleagues at faculty
workshops at the Bar-Ilan, Columbia, Fordham, Hebrew, Michigan, Tel A v i v , T e x a s ,
Vanderbilt, and Virginia law schools, at the Tenth Annual Meetings of the American Law
and Economics Association, and at the Graduate Institute for International Studies in
Geneva. Abigail Carter and Carolyn Frantz provided heroic research assistance throughout
this project; we also thank Christie Öberg, Dina Kallay, and Martin Zimmerman for their
able research and translation support. Thanks to Trudy Feldkamp for secretarial support
and to the Cook Endowment at the University of Michigan Law School for generous
research funding.
See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, T HE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN
A MERICA (1982) [hereinafter BLACK FARMING]; see also infra Part III.A.
1

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968)
(introducing the metaphor); see also infra notes 32, 35 (discussing antecedents). Note
that, following conventional definitions, we distinguish “open access,” a losing game in
which anyone may u s e a resource, from “commons property,” which denotes control by
a bounded group. See also infra page 7 (elaborating this distinction).
2
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structure, be subject to a similar punishing legal regime, and face the same fate
as the black rural landowner.
Until now, institutions for common resource management have been
analyzed primarily through a familiar utilitarian language mapped onto a standard
conceptual map. One school, worrying that rational owners will over-consume
commons resources, embraces the Blackstonian image of private property with
“sole despotic dominion” at the core.3 Another school, after showing how small
close-knit groups can successfully conserve commons resources if they sharply
restrict exit, advocates commons property. 4 For all, the image of tragic
outcomes proves an ideal foil, one that implicitly points theorists toward their
preferred normative solutions. Privatization seems inevitable for utilitarians with
a liberal bent because they believe that locking people together violates a
fundamental concern for individual autonomy.
By contrast, illiberal
communitarian solutions seem relatively attractive to those who are ready to
sacrifice individual autonomy for collective goals. While these underlying
normative commitments have driven the familiar debate over tragic outcomes,
they have never surfaced as the focus for analysis of commons property
management.
We argue that the utilitarian vocabulary which focuses solely on
economic success and the conceptual binary of private/commons property prove
too paltry a framework when utility can not be safely reduced to wealth alone,
that is, when the social gains from cooperation are not just fringe benefits, but
instead are a major part of what people seek. In many property arrangements
– consider, for example, families, partnerships, condominiums, and close
corporations – participation may be of the essence, the terms for exit matter, and
the calculus of utility must account for incommensurable goals. Here, the
underlying normative commitments that animate the “tragedy of the commons”
debate render invisible the most difficult trade-offs and unintentionally freeze legal

See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 A M. ECON.
REV. 347, 354 (1967). On private property, W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (University of Chicago ed., 1979) (1765-69); see also Carol M. Rose,
The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emissions Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 M INN. L. REV. 129, 150-51 (1998) (discussing this image of private property).
3

See, e . g . , ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS : T HE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE A CTION 35-36 (1990); Margaret A. McKean, Success on the
Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource
Management, 4 J. T HEORETICAL POL. 247, 261-62 (1992); William H. Si m o n , SocialRepublican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1343-44 (1991).
4
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imagination and innovation.5 A better approach focuses analysis more directly
on the competing normative goals and doubts their inevitable friction.
We contest communitarianclaims that elevate illiberalcommons property
and too quickly jettison individual autonomy; equally, we dispute privatizers who
assert an exclusive preference for old-fashioned private property and who
disparage cooperation. There is no neutral, pre-political tragedy of the
commons: the metaphor itself assumes either anarchy (no law) or hostile law.
Rightly considered, the problem of managing commons resources concerns not
only tragic outcomes, but also tragic choices: are we doomed to choose
between our liberal commitments and the economic and social benefits available
in a commons? No. Law can mediate liberty and community.
For many resources, the most appealing ownership structure proves to
be a participatory commons regime that also allows members the freedom to
come and go. We call this structure a “liberal commons” – an ideal type of
ownership distinct from both private and commons property, but that draws
elements from each. A legal regime qualifies as a liberal commons when it
enables a limited group of owners to capture the economic and social benefits
from cooperative use of a scarce resource, while also ensuring autonomy to
individual members who retain a secure right to exit. Constructing a successful
liberal commons is indeed a challenge, but it is not an inherently contradictory or
practically unattainable one.6 Ours is a strong claim: creating legal regimes
supportive of liberal commons goals reframes and ultimately dissolves the
tragedy of the commons, one of the core dilemmas for legal theory.
The liberal commons construct should prove useful because it does not
simply revisit ongoing liberty/community and private/commons debates; instead
it reorganizes them altogether around a richer set of questions and answers. On
the questions front, we expand the evaluative prism from a sole focus on
economic success to a broader view that explicitly includes the liberal value of
Cf. FELIX S. COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, in
T HE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 33 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed.,
1960) (showing how legal conceptualism blocks ethical and empirical inquiry and shields
the status quo from normative re-examination); Robert Gordon, New Developments in
Legal Theory, in T HE POLITICS OF LAW 413, 418-21 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (Law is one of
many “clusters of belief,” “which are profoundly paralysis-inducing because they make it
so hard for people . . . even to imagine that life could be different and better.”).
5

6

As Michael Walzer notes, “If we want the mutual reinforcements of community
and individuality to serve a common interest, we will have to act politically to make them
effective. They require certain background or framing conditions that can only be provided
by state action.” M ICHAEL W ALZER, ON T OLERATION 111 (1997).

[Sept. 11, 2000]

THE LIBERAL COMMONS

4

exit as well as non-economic goals of common resource management, such as
intrinsic good of interpersonal cooperation. Here, the liberal commons
framework offers a consistent analytic language engaging precisely the widelyshared values that animate our most important institutions. On the answers front,
an attractive feature of our approach is that it bounds the range of solutions
consonant withliberalcommons values: our normative umbrella, while capacious,
is not unlimited. Across the wide variety of existing institutions where it may be
deployed, the liberal commons construct often yields persuasive arguments for
legal reform.
Legal regimes which account for a substantial and increasing share of
social life – again, consider marital property, condominiums, partnerships, and
close corporations – can be structured as liberal commons forms. With changing
times, people are creating pervasive, though unremarked, variations on the theme
of a liberal commons. When well-tailored, these institutions can encourage
people voluntarily to come together to create limited-access and limited-purpose
communities dedicated to shared management of a scarce resource. They can
offer internal governance mechanisms to facilitate participatory cooperation and
the peaceable joint creation of wealth, while simultaneously limiting minority
oppression and allowing exit.
The goals of this Article are to advance a theory of the liberal commons
and to demonstrate its usefulness. Part I introduces the problem of tragic
choice. Relying on the private/commons dichotomy, theorists have chosen
between liberal or communitarian solutions to commons tragedy. Because they
overlooked the liberal commons synthesis, they missed how law can shift debate
in a happier direction. Part II proposes a theory of the liberal commons that
dissolves the problem of tragic choice. We explore the widely-shared, oftenburied, and potentially-competing goals that law must reconcile when people
want to cooperate but fear abuse; then discuss the background role that law
plays in guiding human behavior; and finally set out the three spheres of decisionmaking that characterize the general form of the liberal commons solution – the
spheres of individual dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperationenhancing exit. Part III rewards the reader’s patience with legal theory by
bringing the liberal commons down to earth. The example of declining black
landownership helps reveal the animating spirit of the American law of coownership, an area of law that systematically thwarts cooperation. Current law
fails them, and us, because it lacks the three features of a liberal commons,
features that other developed legal systems can model. While a liberal commons
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solution may be too late for black farmers, their example can still catalyze useful
reforms.
Can a liberal legal regime facilitate economically and socially productive
use of scarce resources in a crowded world, where people want or need to
work together but worry that others may take advantage of them? A theory of
the liberal commons begins to provide an answer.
I. TRAGIC CHOICE IN PROPERTY THEORY
Most lawyers, economists, and other social scientists learn of the
“tragedy of the commons” in the first weeks of school, 7 all are taught that
commons property is the axiomatic example of a prisoner’s dilemma.8 The usual
economics-oriented reaction has been to build from tragedy to private property;
politicaltheorists, by contrast, often solve tragedy by focusing on thickly-textured
norms and the bonds of close-knit community. Neither camp gives much
focused attention to the role of law or to any values other than economic success
measured along a single metric. This Part shows how the existing conceptual
map pushes theorists into these dichotomous approaches and renders invisible
some of the most challenging dilemmas that underlie management of commons
resources.
A. A Typology of Property Forms
1. The Standard Conceptual Map. – Commons property takes its
place alongside private property and state property as part of the well-worn
trilogy of ownership forms that constitute the conceptual apparatus of property
law.9 These three species of property are generally understood as ideal types,

7

See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 40-59 (4th ed. 1998).

See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
T HEORY AND THE LAW 34 (1994); A VINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF , T HINKING
STRATEGICALLY 347-49 (1991).
8

9

On the limitations imposed by the standard conceptual map, see generally Michael
A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 3 T HEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW
(forthcoming, 2001). For the familiar definitions, see JEREMY W ALDRON, T HE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of
Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3, 5-6 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Duncan Kennedy & Frank I. Michelman, Are Property and
(continued...)
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never present in pure form on the ground, but always available to channel the
justificatory and normative debates that are of ultimate interest to legal theorists
and reformers.10 The process of working from idealized types pervades
property theory stretching back past Locke’s discussion of ownership and
forward to modern images of the commons.
The trilogy is so entrenched as to seem almost natural, beyond serious
contestation or elaboration. Even to suggest tinkering raises a red flag for legal
theorists.11 Nevertheless, the ground is shifting under these old categories to the
point that they divert us from seeing new problems and opportunities. Before
showing how modern theorists have crafted a crabbed version of the commons,
we set commons property in its familiar habitat, nestled alongside private
property and state property.
a. Private Property. Private property is a difficult idea to pin down
precisely, its boundaries always fray at the edges. However, for property
theorists, and, even more so, for ordinary lay folk,12 the term seems reasonably
coherent and capable of simple definition. For example, Jeremy Waldron
defines private property, “around the idea that contested resources are to be
regarded as separate objects each assigned to the decisional authority of some
particular individual(or family or firm).”13 This simple definition can be multiplied
many times over, but all such definitions partake of and help keep current
William Blackstone’s oft-repeated definition of private property as, “that sole
9

(...continued)
Contract Efficient? 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980).
10

For example, Frank Michelman states, “W e need some reasonably clear
conceptio ns of regimes that are decidedly not [private property], with which [private
property] can be compared.” Michelman, supra note 9, at 5.
See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Too Much Property, 21 PHIL. & PUB . A FFAIRS 196,
197-98 (1992). But even Becker concedes, “we would lose a great deal of clarity and rigor
if [the conceptual apparatus] were ignored.” Id. at 198.
11

12

BRUCE A. A CKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-18 (1977)
(exploring the lay view of property).
13

Jeremy Waldron, Property Law , in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND

LEGAL T HEORY 6 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999). Frank Michelman focuses attention his
definition on rules for initial acquisition and reassignment. He focuses particularly the idea
of sole ownership defined to mean, “the rules must allow that at least some objects of
utility or desire can be fully owned by just one person,” and freedom of transfer to mean
“owners are immune from involuntary deprivation or modification of their ownership rights
and empowered to transfer their rights to others at will, in whole or in part.” Michelman,
supra note 9, at 4-5.
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and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”14 The image of sole dominion has never adequately described any real
world property ownership (as even Blackstone recognized).15 Nevertheless, his
image rings through the ages and continues to serve as a focal point for thinking
about property, even as people trade old-fashioned private property for the
novel property arrangements that we call the liberal commons.
b. Commons Property. Some theorists define commons property as
a regime in which every individual may use an object of property and no
individual has the right to stop someone else from using the object.16
Commentators have repeatedly noted that this standard definition obscures an
important distinction between commons property and open access.17 Open
access (or anarchy or no law) is “a scheme of universally distributed, allencompassing privilege.”18 In contrast, commons property designates resources
that are owned or controlled by a finite number of people who manage the
resource together and exclude outsiders,19 what Carol Rose calls “commons on
the inside, property on the outside.”20 This important distinction notwithstanding,

2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also JOHN LOCKE, T WO T REATISES OF
GOVERNMENT , BOOK II, Ch. V (Of Property) (P. Laslett rev. ed., 1963) (3d ed. 1698).
14

3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *212-15; Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk,
or, Blackstone’s Anxieties, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362 n.237 (1993).
15

16

Thus, Frank Michelman defines a commons property regime as one where “there
are never any exclusionary rights. All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they
wish, and are able to do, with whatever objects (conceivably including persons) are in the
[commons].” Michelman, supra note 9, at 5.
S ee JAMES A CHESON, T HE LOBSTER GANGS OF M AINE 142-144 (1988); OSTROM ,
supra note 4, at 48, 222 n.23; GLENN G. STEVENSON , COMMON PROPERTY ECONOMICS: A
GENERAL T HEORY AND LAND USE A PPLICATIONS 8-10, 39-40 (1991); Ellickson, supra note 15,
at 1322; Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 n.4.
17

18

Michelman, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing commons property).

19

OSTROM, supra note 4, at 48, 222 n.23.

Carol M. Rose, Property in the Global Environmental Commons: Comparing
Newfangled Tradeable Rights to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes 5 (draft on file
with authors, April 1999). In other words, despite the similarities between open access
and commons property (multiple users and the resulting collective action difficulties),
commons property is also characterized by an important feature similar to private
(continued...)
20
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the image of open access still comprises the core understanding of commons
property, at least in Anglo-American jurisprudence. As in the open access case,
common property owners are often imagined to be entitled to unregulated use
of the commons resource and entitled to a governance regime in which no
control on resource use – no management or investment decision – can be
imposed on any single commoner absent that individual’s consent.
c. State Property. State property, also called collective property, has
been equally central to standard narratives of property. 21 As Waldron notes,
state property can be defined as a property regime in which, “[i]n principle,
material resources are answerable to the needs and purposes of society as a
whole, whatever they are and however they are determined, rather than to the
needs and purposes of particular individuals considered on their own.”22 Thus,
a state property regime is similar to commons property in that no individual
stands in a specially privileged position with regard to any resource, but it is
distinguished from commons property because the state has a special status or
distinct interest.23 Although, initially, state property was considered the main rival
of private property, 24 it has become a less and less important category,
particularly since state socialism fell and privatization has prevailed more and

20

(...continued)
ownership: in both cases the users’ group is strictly defined. See STEVENSON, supra note
7, at 57; Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1322.
See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
21

22

W ALDRON, supra note 9, at 40 & n.30.

W ALDRON, supra note 9, at 41. Additionally, state property is not just a special
case of a private property regime, where the state just acts as another private owner.
Instead, at a theoretical level, the state is somehow expressing the collective interest in
determining how a state property resource is to be used. The collective, represented
usually by the state, holds all rights of exclusion and is the unitary locus of deci s i o n making regarding u s e of resources. So, a subsidiary set of questions needs to be answered
to specify fully a state property regime, including what is the “collective interest” and what
procedures will be used to apply that conception to a particular resource. Id.
23

24

Indeed, part of the political science literature on the commons has come as a
response to this “false dichotomy.” See OSTROM, supra note 4, at 8-11; Bonnie J. McCay
& James M. Acheson, Human Ecology and the Commons, in T HE QUESTION OF THE
COMMONS : T HE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 1, 7, 9, 13 (Bonnie J.
McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987).
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more in theoretical and policy debates.25 Hence, the trilogy of property forms
often reduces down in practice to a dichotomy of private or commons.26
2. Focusing the Debate. – The familiar conceptual map has limited
debate in three distinct ways.27 First, as Heller has shown, the categorization is
incomplete, and adding new types such as anticommons property may help
make visible previously overlooked problems.28 Second, as Dagan has argued,
the existing categories, such as “private property” may themselves be
renegotiated and a richer, alternative conception developed.29 Third, and the
focus of this work, we show that there is significant analytic and normative
traction to be gained from synthesizing features of existing types, private and
commons, to create vigorous hybrids including the liberal commons.30 There is

25

To be sure, private property systems do contain, and it seems must contain,
public elements, typically organized as state property, such as highways, streets and public
parks. See Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1381 & n.342, 1397 n.413 (noting scale and
inevitability of public space in cities); Rose, supra note 21 (discussing the effect of state
property in enhancing community wealth as well as sociability). Even Soviet socialist law
allowed certain items as “personal property” approximating private property but with limits
on commercial use. See M ichael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 627-29 (1998). Few
contemporary theorists now advocate expanding state property to other resources which
cannot be characterized as public goods.
See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 71 (1997) (the
standard economic analysis of property has “tended to classify ownership status into the
categories all and none, the latter being termed ‘commons property’ – property that has no
restrictions put on its use.”).
26

27

See generally Heller, supra note 9 (elaborating this argument).

28

Heller’s image of anticommons property, and the tragedy that can ensue, shows
how breaking out of the old trilogy can crystalize emerg ing property relations that
otherwise remain invisible. See Heller, supra note 25, at 621 (discussing privatization of
state property in post-socialist economies); Michael A. Heller& Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 290 SCIENCE 698,
698 (1998) (showing how efforts to spur private investment in the biomedical research can
have paradoxical results).
See Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 M ICH.
L. REV. 138, 149 (1999). Dagan advocates a progressive conception of private property,
that incorporates our commitments to social responsibility and to equality. See Hanoch
Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 772-773, 779-781, 791-792
(1999); Hanoch Dagan, Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 M ICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2000).
29

30

See Carol Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and
(continued...)
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a subtle distinction to be made here: our new construct is intended to reflect a
distinct ideal type of ownership, one intended to operate at the same level of
analysis as private or commons property; it does not refer to the opportunistic
mix of private and commons elements that typically appears in any particularized
resource management regime.31
The seemingly immutable opposition of private and commons blinkers
us fromimagining hybrid legislative and judicial solutions; it presents the tragic but
false choice of privatizing a resource or locking people together. Our liberal
commons ideal type offers an analytic tool that deliberately elides the familiar
legal opposition of private and commons, as well as the more fundamental
normative orientation towards liberty or community.

30

(...continued)
Economics of Property, OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on file with authors)
(discussing “limited commons property” hybrids).
31

Bob Ellickson sugges ts two relevant types of organizational diversity, two
manifestations of “the eclecticism of land regimes:” either variations in the “initial bundles
of rights and transfer rules” or opportunistic mixtures of public and private ownership. See
Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1387-88. The liberal commons construct relates only to the
former type. For an example of the other type, consider Henry E. Smith, Semicommon
Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. L EGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000)
(discussing the medieval open-field system as a “semicommons:” a resource “owned and
used in common for one major purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose,
individual economic units . . . have property rights to separate pieces of the commons”).
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B. Commons Tragedy as Privatization Foil
1. From Demsetz . . . – Echoing a familiar Aristotelian theme,32 the
conventional wisdom for many social scientists is that commons property
generally leads to tragedy.33 This claim – a truism of first-year law classes – is
usually introduced as one of the strongest justifications for the institution of
private property. 34 Although Garrett Hardin coined the term “the tragedy of the

32

See A RISTOTLE, T HE POLITICS, Bk. II (H. Rackham, trans., 1932). A classic passage

is:
Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives th e l e a s t
attention; men care most for their private possessions, and for what they own in
common less, or only so far as it falls to their own individual share; for in addition
to the other reasons, they think less of it on the ground that someone else is
thinking about it.
Id. at Ch. 1, § 10 (Bekker § 1261b30-35). Also consider:
[R]egulations for the common ownership of property would give more causes for
discontent; for if both in the enjoyment of the produce and in the work of
production they prove not equal but unequal, complaints are bound to arise
between those who enjoy or take much but work little and those who take less but
w ork more. And in general to live together and share all our human affairs is
difficult, and especially to share such things as these [farms and produce].
Id. at Ch. 2, § 2-3 (Bekker § 1263a10-17).
33

Much of the influential recent thinking on property rights has come from
divergent camps of economists – such as Demsetz, Alchian, North, and others – who have
extrapolated from the historical experience of Western European and American capitalism.
For a sampling of classics, see, e.g., D OUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT P. T HOMAS , T HE RISE
OF THE W ESTERN W ORLD: A N EW ECONOMIC H ISTORY (1973); Armen Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 A M. ECON. REV.
777 (1972); Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON.
HISTORY 16 (1973); BARZEL, supra note 8; Demsetz supra note 3; Eiric G. Furubotn &
Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory, 10 J. ECON. LIT . 1137 (1972);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and the Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Svetozar Pejovich,
Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation of Property Rights, 30 REV. SOC . ECON. 309
(1972).
See, e.g., GOTTFRIED DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 9 (1995, 1963)
(“[T]he institution of private property has been defended on the grounds of justice,
freedom, progress, peace, and happiness. . . . Common Ownership, although enjoying
temporary vogues, has been rejected as utopian, as incompatible with the good of society
and the individual, as productive of quarrels , as retarding development, as restraining
34

freedom, as arbitrary and unjust.”).
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commons,”35 Harold Demsetz was the first theorist to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis that aims systematically to establish the long-run superiority of private
property over commons property. 36
Demsetz discussed three types of costs fromcommons property regimes:
increased negotiating costs because of holdouts; increased policing or
monitoring costs; and the difficulties of too high a discount rate, so that
commoners do not fully internalize the interests of future generations.37 Private
property, he claimed, generally solves these problems by concentrating costs and
benefits on owners, thus creating incentives to more efficient utilization of
resources.38 Demsetz was fully aware that these costs will not disappear in a

See Hardin, supra note 2. Before Hardin, H. Scott Gordon identified the tragedy
without so labeling it. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Proper ty
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). Hardin claimed that rational co-owners
are bound to under-invest in the common resource, while over-exploiting it. Hardin, supra
note 2, at 1244-45. But he never considered the costs of any other legal arrangement, in
particular the establishment and maintenance of a private property regime. As Michael
Taylor points out, “Every solution, every combination of property rights and controls, has
its costs. Private property rights are not costlessly created, modified, and enforced; state
regulation does not come free; and both may have effects which it is impossible to cost.
What solution is best must surely depend to some extent on the relative costs of the
possible solutions. Hardin ignores them.” Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics
of Property Rights and Common Pool Resources, 32 NAT . RES . J. 633, 635 (1992).
35

36

See generally Demsetz, supra note 3.

Id. at 354-56. The difficulties of free riders for collective action has been
recognized by jurists much before the recent law-and-economics scholarship, as the
following Jewish law example demonstrates. Rabbi Yair Hayyim Bachrach of Germany (d.
1701) addressed the validity of a stipulation in a contract between some members of a
community and an expert in shofar (ram’s horn) blowing, according to which the ritual
service is to be performed only in the name of the paying members of the community. In
his opinion, R. Bachrach noted that the stipulation should apparently be classified as the
type in which “one benefits and the other sustains no loss” (pareto-superiority in modern
language), a type to which the ap plicable Jewish law rule was “exemption,” that is, the
stipulation could not operate to deprive non-paying members from the spiritual benefits of
the contract. But R. Bachrach was also attentive to the detrimental incentive effects (freeriding) of applying the exemption rule in these circumstances. His result seems
unavoidable: the contracting members were indeed allowed to restrict the group of spiritual
beneficiaries of the shofar blowing to themselves only. R. Hayyim Yair Bachrach,
Responsa Havat Yair, Resp. 186.
37

38

Demsetz, supra note 3, at 356-57.
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private property regime, but he insisted that they will be dramatically reduced.39
His account includes also an evolutionary story that explains how private
property rights develop to internalize these externalities when pressure increases
on use of a resource.40 The evolutionary part of his celebrated contribution has
been rightly criticized, and the problem remains a puzzle.41 But Demsetz’s first
proposition, that private property is more cost-beneficial once demand pressures
are high enough, remains the conventional wisdom.
2. . . . To Recent Law-and-Economics. – Over the years, Demsetz’s
account has been somewhat refined. Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill offer a more
rigorous account of the benefits and costs of private property rights definition and
enforcement activity. 42 Variables such as the crime rate, population density,
cultural and ethical attitudes, and the pre-existing “rules of the game” of the

39

Id. at 356.

Id. at 350-53. Private property rights “arise when it becomes economic for those
affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs.” Id. at 354. See also Hardin, supra
note 1, at 1245.
40

See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part 2 , 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB .
POL’Y 324, 336-38 & n.44 (1992) (arguing that both Hardin and Demsetz end up begging the
same question, assuming the same problem away, implicitly arguing that a community
plagued by non-cooperation can improve its condition by cooperating); see also
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 59, 6; Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling:
Prespectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. LAW &
HUMAN. 37 (1990). As Jim Krier reports to the authors, Demsetz has replied to the many
criticisms of his theory by saying, “That's why I called it Toward a Theory of Property
Rights.”
41

See Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 163 (1975). They argue that increasing levels of
definition and enforcement activity lead to benefits because of the increased probability
that people will be able to appropriate an asset’s worth. To elaborate, the benefit from
property rights definition depends upon the value of the asset and the degree to which the
activity ensures that the value will be captured by the owner. Any change in the price of
the well-defined and enforced bundle of rights changes the return on resources devoted
to property rights questions. Furthermore, any increase in the productivity of a definition
and enforcement activity will shift the marginal benefit curve outward. An increase in the
probability of loss of an asset will usually result in an increase in the productivity of
property rights activity and thus will result in such a shift. Marginal benefits are also likely
a declining function as definition and enforcement activity increases (for reasons similar
to the declining marginal physical product of any input in general). Conversely, the
marginal costs of property rights reorganization are increasing because of the opportunity
cost of resources used in property rights definition activities. Id.; see also Smith, supra
note 31, at 164 (making a similar claim).
42
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institutional structure, affect the probability of securing benefits from betterdefined property rights. Anything that reduces the quantity of resources or
lowers their opportunity cost – such as changes in technology, in resource
endowments, or in the scale of operation – will affect marginal costs. The
equilibrium level of property rights definition and enforcement activity occurs
where marginal benefit and cost curves intersect. Anderson and Hill argue that
the contingency of factors influencing costs and benefits explains why we observe
varying degrees of definition and enforcement activity and thus varying degrees
of property arrangements covering the spectrum from commons to private. But,
their model does not dispute Demsetz’s most fundamental claim: that increasing
demand requires a move away from commons property toward private property.
Commons property may be temporarily efficient, but in time, as the demand for
scarce resources inevitably increases, privatization prevails.43
Robert Ellicksonrefines the cost-benefit analysis further, but implicitly still
shares in the fundamental claim regarding the demise of commons property. 44
Ellickson distinguishes among the advantages of individual ownership in what he
terms “small” “medium” and “large” events, each with rather different costbenefit analyses.45 He acknowledges the possible merits of commons property
only regarding one category, that of large events. Group ownership of land can
sometimes be advantageous, he explains, because of “increasing returns to scale
and the desirability of spreading risks.”46 But the examples he gives for cases in

See also JAMES E. PENNER, T HE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 69 (1997) (arguing that
“although in some situations commons work,” scarcity generally “gives rise to conflict,”
and thus “the general point” – the “obvious solution” – is “to link rights of u s e with rights
of exclusion,” namely: private property).
43

44

See generally Ellickson, supra note 15.

45

Respecting small events, Ellickson identifies three basic reasons for the relative
efficiency of individual private property in terms of monitoring costs: self-control by one
person is simpler than the multi-person coordination entailed by intra-group monitoring;
detecting a trespasser is less demanding than evaluating the conduct of persons otherwise
privileged to u s e a resourc e; and policing boundaries or carrying out other monitoring
functions is easier for an individual landowner, who will be more highly motivated than a
member of a commons group. Likewise, Ellickson identifies three advantages of individual
ownership with regard to medium events: excessive dependence of coordination through
large-numbered transactions can be avoided; cooperation becomes more probable because
of relatively multiplex relationships among neighbors; and dispute settlement arising out
of medium events can be relegated to those persons most likely to be informed about the
controversy. Id. at 1327-33.
46

Id. at 1332.
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which economies of scale and risk-spreading favor commons property – three
pioneer settlements in the 17th and 19th centuries47 – are indeed exotic and
almost idiosyncratic, especially from the perspective of a modern market
economy.
Only a few economics-oriented authors have challenged Demsetz’s
underlying proposition, the most prominent of whom is Barry Field.48 Field’s
insight derives from recent research in European social history which strongly
suggests that communal agricultural property may have been antedated by a
system that was more individualistic, carried out on small, individual fields rather
than in communal lots. Hence, Field suggests that property rights economists
need to explain two opposite changes using just one causal factor: they need to
show how population growth in one period could produce a shift from individual
to common tenures, and later produce a shift from commons to individual
property. Field suggests that plausible circumstances could be identified where
developmental pressures encourage greater use of common, rather than
individualproperty. 49 His analysis generates some indeterminacy in the economic
inevitability of shifting to private property with increasing pressure on a resource.
While a challenge to the conventional economic wisdom, Field’s move is only a
first step for our purposes.
To develop a theory of a liberal commons, we must consider the
possibility of successful management of commons resources not as an
intermediate condition but as an end state, and we must learn the prerequisites

47

Id. at 1335-41.

48

Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319 (1989).

Id. at 319-20, 328. To see why, consider the impact of increases in demand on the
costs and benefits of establishing and maintaining a private property regime. As Demsetz
claimed, the increasing value of output justifies some additional costs in creating and
maintaining a system of private property; the higher returns possible in a system of private
property justify the accompanying increase in exclusion costs. Field insists, however, that
this analysis is incomplete because it takes exclusion costs as given. But the effectiveness
of resources devoted to exclusion depends on the incentives that exist for encroachment,
which are related to the derived value of the resource. If the resource has no value, there
would be little incentive to encroach, and thus it would be relatively easy to exclude, other
things equal. So an increase in value of output could be expected to increase the incentive
for encroachment, which implies that additional resources are required to achieve the same
effective level of exclusion that pertained before. If this effect is particularly strong, it may
overcome the effect identified by Demsetz and lead to commons property as the ultimate
outcome. See also id. at 329 (demonstrating similar ambiguous effects with respect to
population growth).
49
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for such success. Hardin, Demsetz, Anderson & Hill, Ellickson, and many
others, have helped to establish a sense of the inevitability of privatization and the
necessary failure of commons ownership. The economic literature takes us only
so far in countering that sentiment; political theorists push the debate further,
perhaps too far in the other direction.
C. Commons Tragedy as Communitarian Foil
In sharp contrast to the role commons property plays in neoclassical
economic-legal theory, many political scientists (and some new institutional
economists) have come to celebrate another version of commons property. 50
Political theorists have supplied a wealth of case studies of well-functioning
commons property regimes around the globe, thus demonstrating empirically the
falsity of claims (or assumptions) that commons property regimes are bound to
generate tragic outcomes, defined in terms of wasted resources.51 They teach
that neither privatization nor regulation are the only ways to conserve scarce
resources and manage them productively.52 However, these accounts also show
– albeit often implicitly – that commons success stories typically compromise
individuals’ right to exit, and therefore they do not do much to help establish our
claims for a liberal commons.
1. From Taylor . . . – A recent debate between two leading scholars
of this group – Michael Taylor and Elinor Ostrom – illustrates our arguments.
Taylor believes that “community with mutual vulnerability is what endows some
groups with the means to regulate their commons endogenously.”53 For him, a
community is a more-or-less stable set of members with some shared beliefs,

50

One foc al point for this group of scholars appears to be the International
Association for the Study of Commons Property (IASCP), which holds an annual
convention drawing hundreds. See McKean, supra note 4, at 249 n.4 (noting the IASCP).
51

Of course, there are also numerous counter-examples, where locking people
together to manage a resource has disastrous effects. To give one particularly poignant
example, consider American policy toward Native American landholdings which has lead
to a classic tragedy of the anticommons. See Michael A. Heller, Boundaries of Private
Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1213-17 (1999) (discussing the consequences of federal
allotment policy which prohibited alienation, yet did not provide any collective governance
mechanism for managing land resources).
52

See, e.g., McCay & Acheson, supra note 24, at 1, 7, 9, 13.

Sarah Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and
Community, 4 J. T HEO. POL. 309, 311 (1992).
53
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including normative beliefs and preferences beyond those constituting their
collective action problem, who expect to continue interacting with one another
for some time to come and whose relations are direct (unmediated by third
parties) and multiplex (concerning a range of issues on which there can be give
and take). Stable membership, continuing interaction, and direct and multiplex
relationships, Taylor explains, all make mutual monitoring easy and cheap.
The success of commons property, in other words, comes exclusively
from factors within the group and is premised on the group’s social cohesion.
Therefore, Taylor concludes, success also depends on a lack of great economic
or social differences among the community members. Differences in income,
wealth or class positions or in ethnicity, race, caste, language or religion weaken
or undermine his conditions for community and thus threaten the success of
commons property. 54
2. . . . To Ostrom. – Ostrom claims, correctly in our view, that Taylor’s
story relegates the commons to a marginal status in contemporary circumstances,
irrelevant for larger, heterogeneous, and changing sets of individuals.55 Ostrom
represents for us another genre of commons theorists who are more useful for
our purposes. Strong community, she claims, is neither sufficient nor ex ante
necessary for solving resource dilemmas in commons property. Even
heterogenous sets of individuals may overcome the commons difficulties with the
help of proper institutional innovation and design, although if they do not develop
shared values, they will eventually fail. 56 Ostrom studies institutional
arrangements that help groups break out of the commons trap. Thus, in her
celebrated book, Governing the Commons, she demonstrates how these

See M ICHAEL T AYLOR , COMMUNITY , A NARCHY, AND LIBERTY 104-29 (1982);
Singleton & Taylor, supra note 53, at 316.
54

Se e Elinor Ostrom, Community and the Endogenous Solution of Common
Problem s , 4 J. T HEO. POL. 343, 347 (1992). See also Fred P. Bosselman, Replaying the
Tragedy of the Commons, 13 YALE J. REG. 391, 399-400 (1996) (reviewing OSTROM, supra
note 4).
55

Ostrom, supra note 55, at 347-50. See also, e.g., Lawrence Taylor, “The River
Would Run Red with Blood”: Community and Common Property in an Irish Fishing
Settleme n t , i n T HE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS , supra note 24, at 290, 305-06
(distinguishing between “traditional communities” that understand collective ownership
as natural, rather than deriv ed from discrete decisions to cooperate, and “contractual
communities” whose conceptions of community and common property have more specific
origins; noting that contractual communities frequently manage common resources
through institutions and may be “equally ‘close-knit ’.”)
56
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arrangements may distinguish between cases of long-enduring commons and
cases of failures and fragilities.57
Any attempt to devise a theory of the liberal commons must take account
of Ostrom’s design principles. Before doing so, however, an important question
of relevance arises from her work. Notwithstanding her opposition to Taylor’s
extreme communitarianism, Ostrom’s genre also implies an important illiberal
component which she does not confront because of her exclusive focus on
rebutting the neoclassical economists’ “tragic outcome” story. Ostrom’s success
stories, as well as most others reported in the literature, include limitations on
alienability. In the purest case, there is no market in which rights to the commons
can be bought, leased or exchanged. Rights are conferred only on a particular
class of eligible persons and may not be transferred to persons outside of that
class. In a few systems, the sale of shares is allowed, but only to other eligible
users of the commons, never to outsiders. These inalienabilities strengthen the
bonds among co-owners and reinforce their rights in the commons, thus
facilitating their cooperation.58
Ostrom and her allies do not even consider that the price of their
commons successes – which require locking people together in static
communities – may be too high, particularly for those who place a high value on
individual liberty. If commons property can succeed only by giving up the right
to exit, a liberal commons is indeed an oxymoron. While not liberalism’s sole
characteristic nor a goal beyond compromise, exit is nevertheless a crucial liberal
value. Exit enables individuals independently to choose the groups to which they
belong and to remain in them from free choice. Exit allows individuals
geographical, social, professional, political and familial mobility. These mobilities
and the existence of “open boundaries” are important prerequisites for the
freedom to strive to promote one’s own happiness. A free society perceives
limitations on exit with suspicion and attempts to minimize them. Our theory of
a liberal commons cannot just adopt the findings of these political scientists,

OSTROM, supra note 4, at 58-102, 143-81; see also Field, supra note 48, at 321, 335,
337. Field argues that both the exclusion of non-commoners (the costs of private property)
and the transactions among commoners (the costs of commons property) – are carried out
by the collectivity. Thus, “we can look on political innovations as also having a distinct
role to play in determining efficient property institutions in a society.” Id. More
specifically, innovations in institutions of internal common governance may facilitate
commons property, whereas innovations in the institutions of boundary maintenance and
exclusion support private property.
57

58

See McKean, supra note 4, at 261-62.
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although we will, to be sure, make extensive use of them. Rather, we must show
that ownership and management of commons resources is not doomed to
tragedy as the neoclassical economists might suggest, nor its successes limited
to illiberal environments as the political theorists might imply.
II. A THEORY OF THE LIBERAL COMMONS
We must show that a liberalcommons offers something people want, that
existing legal regimes can be modified in realistic ways that would get us there,
and that the resulting commons property institutions can be, at the same time,
both liberal and prosperous. The first section explores the goals that a liberal
commons must achieve: preserving exit while promoting the economic and social
gains from cooperation. While these goals may appear to conflict, law can
mediate them, but only if law is understood to operate as a set of background
norms, a safety net that can catalyze trust in daily interactions. No individual
legal rule matters so much as the tone they collectively convey, that the law
smiles on trust and cooperation. The second section sets out the core of our
theory, the three spheres of action that any legal regime must adopt to achieve
liberal commons goals. These three features – the sphere of individual dominion,
the sphere of democratic-self-governance, and the sphere of cooperationenhancing exit – comprise what we call the general form of the liberal commons.
A. Identifying the Goals
We focus here on what may be called “meso” or mid-level goals, those
that are intrinsic to the general liberal commons form and that are amenable to
law reform. Application of the liberal commons form to any particular institution,
such as the family, condos, or close corporations, would require considering two
other levels of normative goals. First, there may be “micro” nuanced values that
inhere in the particular institution being considered for reform in a liberal
commons direction. For example, any application of our theory to marital
property must account for deep cultural concerns with the ultimate collective
goods of marriage, such as intimacy, caring and commitment, and selfidentification.59 Adapting the general liberal commons form to the marital context
may require some fine-tuning that would allow the accommodation of these

See Hanoch Dagan, Abigail V. Carter & Carolyn J. Frantz, A Theory of Marital
Property (draft on file with authors).
59
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values. Other liberal commons settings, like condominiums and close
corporations, may require responding to widely-held values particular to these
settings. Second, there may be “macro” social commitments that transcend the
liberal commons form but necessarily inform analysis of all such institutions. For
example, concern for non-subordination of women in families and non-exclusion
of minorities in condominiums will necessarily refine analyses of those
institutions.60 These macro values may be so widely-shared and deeply-held as
to justify their imposition in a particular liberal commons form even when they
differ from or perhaps conflict with the micro values of that form. Considered
together, these three levels of values – micro, meso, and macro – can help
account for existing institutions for common resource management in their best
light, and therefore also to point towards normatively attractive reforms.61 In this
section, we focus only on meso goals, those that attach to the general form of
the liberal commons.
1. Preserving Exit. –
a. Why Exit Matters. Exit is a bedrock liberal value, an essential
element of a liberal commons, and a core term of art in political and legal theory.
As defined by Albert O. Hirschman,62 exit means “voluntarily leaving the
effective jurisdiction of the group,”63 whether that group is a nation, firm, or other
type of organization. Exit stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to engage;
the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other persons.64
At the minimum, exit serves a protective function: “If the group harms the
interests of the member as the member sees them, then leaving is a form of a selfdefense.”65 Note that the protective function of exit also has an important ex
ante incentive effect on group behavior: “[t]he possibility of exit may itself make

See respectively id. and Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, Condos Without
Tears (draft on file with authors); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing
anti-discrimination principle as limit on associational preferences of groups).
60

See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW ’S EMPIRE 52-53, 164-258 (1986) (developing this
interpretive method).
61

62

A LBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT , VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).

See Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL T HEORY 165, 171 (1998); see also id. at
177 (stating that “the core right of exit” is “the claim right that others not prevent one from
leaving the jurisdiction of the group”).
63

64

See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62, at 19-21.

65

Green, supra note 63, at 171.
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the group responsive to the interests of its members.”66 In addition to its intrinsic
importance, the group’s responsiveness is instrumentally important. The threat
of exit is often one of the prominent mechanisms of disciplining social
organizations and optimizing the use of the common resource.67
The multiple functions of exit matter to liberals because they “enhance the
capacity for a self-directed life, including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue
our ends.”68 Generally, liberals are committed to “open boundaries,” that is, to
the idea that people should be able to leave the groups with which they choose
to associate (and sometimes they should also be able to abandon even their own
current identities).69 In some accounts, liberalism may even be defined as a
theory that adopts, justifies, and applies a strong commitment to geographical,
social, familial, and political mobility – all in the name of promoting the individual
freedom necessary to secure one’s own personal happiness.70 No doubt, a
moderate restraint on exit – either an exit tax or departure delay, for example –
need not be considered offensive to liberalism. Indeed, consistent with liberal
convictions, such soft constraints may well be necessary to ensure that the
decision to leave is informed (not hasty and ignorant) and sincere (not
opportunistic).71 But a regime that makes exit impractical through outright
prohibitions or via rules that de facto prohibit exit (including rules that impose
prohibitive exit costs) or unreasonably delay exit, is incompatible with the most
fundamental liberal tenets.72 Exit restraints that just treat individuals
instrumentally cannot be legitimate features of a liberal commons.
The critical virtues that exit enhances help to explain its status throughout
liberal legal regimes.73 Despite the tide of fundamentalism in parts of the world,
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Id. at 171.
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See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62, at 22-25.
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Green, supra note 63, at 176.

See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. T HEORY
6, 11-12, 15-16 (1990).
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Id. at 21.
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We develop this point infra at Section II.B.3.

See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in
Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1053, 1099-1101, 1126-27 (1998).
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Admittedly, this is not the only justification for these inalienabilities. Another
important justification comes from efficiency. See Heller, supra note 51, at 1199-1201
(continued...)
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certain rights of exit – such as the right to emigrate from one’s homeland and the
right to divorce – are increasingly considered basic human rights which are, as
such, inalienable and non-waiveable.74 Closer to our discussion here, property
law is generally suspicious of restraints on alienation, even consensual restraints
that limit mobility respecting any particular resource.75 Often, statutes prohibit
and courts invalidate outright restraints on alienability; with more moderate
restraints, courts may impose time limits, or otherwise protect an individual’s
right to exit.76 People generally do not perceive interference with restrictions on
alienability to be unwarranted intrusion into freedom of contract; rather the
interference protects against agreements that undermine a key purpose of
contractual freedom, that is, securing individual autonomy.77
We can safely sidestep ongoing disputes among liberal theorists
regarding the precise role of exit, such as whether exit is, by itself, a sufficient

73

(...continued)
(discussing role of restrictions on restraint on alienability); see also Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-15 (1972) (discussing the inefficiency of restraints
on alienation but also suggesting “instances, perhaps many, in which economic efficiency
is more closely approximated by such limitations”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability
and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. R EV . 931 (1985) (accepting that
“unencumbered market trades are desirable unless we can locate a valid reason for their
restriction” while broadening the range of efficient restrictions on alienability from the
Calabresi & Melamed model); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 970, 971-72 (1985) (setting out the efficiency argument for alienation, and arguing
against restraints on alienation to achieve distributional goals).
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 13, 16, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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See, Heller, supra note 51, at 1199.
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On contractual freedom and individual autonomy, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
PROMISE: A T HEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 7-17 (1981). To be sure, liberalism is
also committed to favoring contractual freedom to craft whatever restraints people agree
to abide. But one can and should distinguish ordinary contracts – where liberal values do
not reject strong lock-ins – from property arrangements that encompass much more of an
individual’s resources and social life. Regarding these latter arrangements, we insist that
a liberal commitment to choice can not be exhausted by an initial election of an illiberal exit
rule. Limiting people’s ability to waive their exit rights, in this context, is based only in part
on a response to rationality-deficiencies, such as excessive optimism and lack of foresight.
Also, perhaps even primarily, these limits are premised on the commitment to a conception
of individual liberty that puts a high value on people’s ability to “re-invent themselves.”
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condition to preserve individual autonomy.78 For our purposes, we assert only
the modest, and we think uncontroversial, proposition that some strong version
of exit is a fundamental, core right in any theory worth labeling as liberal.79 As
we see it, exit enables individuals to determine their own group associations and
to remain in the groups they choose out of their free choice only. In short, the
possibility of exit allows individuals the mobility which is a prerequisite for liberty.
b. Is Entry Like Exit? Is free entry the mirror image of free exit, and
as such also a core element of the liberal commons? Only to a limited extent.
Liberals, in other words, are not, and should not be, concerned with every
limitation on entry. Liberals who are committed to pluralism and diversity80 and
who recognize of the significance of culture and community to personal identity,81
must be careful not to condemn or criticize every homogeneous community and
every exclusionary practice.82 Rather, they must acknowledge that commitment
to the permeability of groups should not lead one excessively to undermine the
stability of groups’ constituents and their common purpose, or to too harsh a
treatment of any preferential treatment accorded insiders.83 Accordingly, insofar
as we are concerned with groups which only partially cover their members’
associational world (as is almost always the case today), we have no difficulty
in accepting that exclusion of bad cooperators is a paramount concern of any
successful commons, and that limitations of entry which help preserve some
parochial interests can be instrumental to the success of liberal commons
Compare Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in T HE RIGHTS
M INORITY CULTURES 238 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995), with Green, supra note 63 (arguing
that exit is not sufficient to secure individual autonomy in groups).
78
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Recall also that even aside from liberal theory, exit is a value with many virtues,
including, but not limited to, serving as a disciplinary limit on organizations
See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in T HE CROOKED T IMBER OF
HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991); JOHN KEKES ,
M ORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, T HE M ORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
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See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 155-74 (1994); Chaim Gans,
Freedom and Identity in Liberal Nationalism (unpublished manuscript on file with
authors).
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See Roderick M. Hills, You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 M ICH. L. REV. 1588, Pt.
I (1997).
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See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1375, 1375 (1994) (arguing that, within limits, we should approve the way residential
associations “allow individuals with common preferences to gravitate to a common location
where they can pursue their conception of the good life”).
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regimes.84 As Michael Walzer puts it, “we need to sustain and enhance
associational ties, even if these ties connect some of us to some others and not
to everyone else.”85
Although a liberal theory does not require free entry, we think that there
are two extreme types of entry limitations so troublesome that a regime allowing
either cannot truthfully embody the constellation of values generally considered
to constitute liberalism. First, there are cases in which a limitation of entry so
sweepingly restricts alienability that it is practically tantamount to a substantial
limitation on exit. In these cases, the liberal commitment to free exit, rather than
the more tempered commitment to free entry, condemns the limitation. Second,
some exclusionary practices and criteria – for example, a systematic exclusion
by communities of a majority group that is based on prejudice respecting issues
like race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual preference – may well infringe upon
fundamental liberal values of equal concern and respect.86 Delineating the scope
of such prohibited classifications, as well as of any surrogates of such
classifications that should be likewise prohibited, is an important and complex
task, but well outside the scope of our project.87 For our purposes here it is
enough to state that a liberal commons must always be careful not to cross the
fine line between permitted homogeneity of purpose and prohibited
discriminatory exclusion.
2. Promoting Cooperation. –
a. Maximizing Economic Gains. So, one goal of a liberal commons
is to preserve the virtues that come from exit; the other goal is to achieve the
economic and social gains possible from cooperation. On the economic side,
several types of efficiency gain may be available from joint management and
pooling resources in a commons, for example economies of scale and risk-

See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and the Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 50-53 (1989).
84
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W ALZER, supra note 6, at 105.

See Alexander, supra note 84, at 38, 54-55; see, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) (holding that court enforcement of a racially restrictive housing covenant violates
the equal protection clause).
86

Developing this point are Hills, supra note 82, at 1592-1614, and Gillette, supra
note 83, at 1397-99; see also Alexander, supra note 84, at 56-61 (advocating a legal regime
of open-ended standards for governing the question of the limits of group autonomy, in
order to “create opportunities for those inside and those outside to engage each other in
dialogue”); see generally Rosen, supra note 72 (suggesting the outer limits of community
self-governance that may entailed by John Rawls’ Political Liberalism).
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spreading.88 The familiar economic approach acknowledges that in evaluating
“whether the resources are common pool or amenable to privatization, particular
natural resources configurations, technological constraints, and transaction costs
may make commons property a superior solution to private property.”89 Thus,
with landownership, larger parcels may be preferred over small ones: in the
agricultural context, larger parcels may economize on fencing and cultivation
costs (especially where specialized equipment is available);90 in urban contexts,
larger parcels may allow construction of more valuable projects. And where a
number of people own land together, they may be able to divide the risks of
ownership. Because most people are risk-averse, risk-spreading through
common ownership may be efficiency-enhancing, as for example, with land
holdings that represent a large and otherwise undiversifiable part of individual
wealth.
b. Recognizing Social Value. Alongside potential efficiency gains,
people could prefer cooperation simply to receive the benefits of working
together, of taking part in successful collective enterprise.91 Cooperation, in
other words, is a good, in and of itself, in addition to its importance in facilitating
economic success. People value interpersonal relationships – they form
associations and take part in collective enterprises – not only for instrumental
reasons as a means to some independently specified end: “We human beings are
social creatures, and creatures with values. Among the things that we value are
our relations with each other.”92
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See Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1332-44.
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STEVENSON, supra note 17, at 70.

See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee, Land Reforms: Prospects and Strategies 2
(Conference Paper, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics,
Washington D.C.; and MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 99-24).
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See JON ELSTER, T HE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 187 (1989)
(arguing that successful collective action is produced by a “mix of motivations – selfish
and normative, rational and irrational. . . . Motivations that taken separately would not get
collective action off the ground may interact, snowball and build upon each other so that
the whole exceeds the sum of its parts.”). Carol Rose helpfully suggests that our emphasis
on the social value of cooperation can be re-framed in terms of the synergistic (rather than
merely aggregative) benefits of cooperation.
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See Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB . A FF .
189 (1997). In a similar vein, Walzer notes, “Individuals are stronger, more confident, more
savvy, when they are participants in a common life, when they are responsible to and for
other people.” W ALZER, supra note 6, at 104.
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Our relationships with our spouses, children, friends, neighbors, fellowworkers, and other types of commoners have intrinsic value that people often
strive to promote.93 Liberal commons settings are particularly suitable for
furthering these social relationships because certain tasks – like the common
management of a given resource – are an opportunity to enrich and solidify the
interpersonal capital that grows from cooperation and support, trust and mutual
responsibility. 94 Indeed, in some settings, such as in marriage and in some
religions and cultural communities, the commons resource may even form the
center of a way of life that profoundly affects the commoners’ self-identity.95

See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 15, at , 1345, 1395 (noting that companionship and
the solidification of “mutual-aid relationships” are potential benefits of living in a multimember household, and pointing out to satisfaction of “living in a social environment that
is consistent with [one’s] ideology”); Simon, supra note 4, at 1364 (praising cooperative
housing as “creat[ing] a fairly strong form of interdependence, as well as opportunities for
collective action”); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1769-70 (1990)
(concluding that worker ownership may bring non-economic benefits: the satisfaction of
engaging in a communal activity; a strengthened psychological worker-firm relationship
that reduces the potentially unpleasant adversarial nature and conflict of interest that
inheres in this relationship; the psychological benefit of control over resources; and
training for democratic participation that may benefit society generally as well as the
workers themselves).
93

See Alexander, supra note 84, at 26, 41-42 (pointing out to the intrinsic good of
the experience of belonging which is based on a shared good or a shared resource); cf.
PENNER, supra note 43, at 181 (arguing that exclusive use – the core feature of private
property – suits an impersonal social situation). See also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503,
1515-16 (2000) (arguing that joining forces with others in achieving a common goal,
conditional on the others’ willingness to do the same, creates a collective agent or plural
subject, entitling each member to refer to them all as “we;” thus, such common tasks enable
people to “make claims upon one another in the name of what we are supposed to be
doing”).
94

See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 635,
637 (1980); Jeramy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 19-20 (1992).
See also, e.g., A N D R E W GRAY, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT : SELF DETERMINATION IN AN A MAZONIAN COMMUNITY 109, 111 (1997) (describing the close
identification of land and other resources with individuals and groups among the Arakmbut
of the southeastern Peruvian rainforest); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group
Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO A RTS AND ENT .
L.J. 194 (2000) (“The group product in the indigenous society is the medium through which
all tribal members, living, dead and unborn, speak their voice and become a part of the tribal
way.”)
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c. Reconciling Economic and Social Values. In many liberal commons
contexts, economic gains and social values tend to reinforce one another.
Interpersonal capital facilitates trust which, in turn, gives rise to economic
success. And economic success tends to strengthen trust and mutual
responsibility. But we can imagine contexts in which the imperatives of economic
success and social cohesion conflict. Any liberal commons must pay some
attention to both fronts. Both are intrinsically valuable and thus should not be
abandoned. Furthermore, either total economic failure or the collapse of social
cohesion will effectively end cooperative resource management and likely yield
a tragic outcome.
But beyond this modest imperative, we do not attempt to come up with
any general formula for solving such conflicts. It would be incredible to suggest
that the relative importance of economic success and of social cohesion is
constant over the vast realms of life – from families to close corporations – in
which liberal commons regimes may be established. Rather, we believe that
setting the balance between these two happy outcomes of cooperation – to the
extent that they are in conflict – must be context-dependent. There are realms
of life in which the commoners’ economic success is likely to play a rather major
role (a close corporation may be an example) and there are others (say, the
family) in which a significant degree of inefficiency may be a tolerable price for
securing the social goods of cooperation.
3. Do Exit and Cooperation Conflict? – The two goals of the liberal
commons – preserving autonomy through exit and achieving the economic and
social gains from cooperation – may work at cross purposes. This simple,
troubling observation lies at the core of the “tragedy of the commons” metaphor.
The ownership and management of commons resources may exemplify the most
familiar of all collective action problems,96 one often formalized as a multi-person
prisoner’s dilemma with an incentive structure facilitating non-cooperative
behavior and generating tragic outcomes.97 If the story stopped there, this first
cut would be rather disappointing because there would be no way people could
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Collective action is a generic term describing the difficulty faced by a group of
self-interested individuals where the promotion of their self-interest requires cooperation.
Even if they all agree on both their collective purpose and the best means to promote it,
they will still face difficulties in achieving it, since for each and every one of them the
individual interest supersedes their collective good. See M ANCUR OLSON, T HE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE A CTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE T HEORY OF GROUPS 2, 7-8, 10-11, 16, 21, 51, 6061 (2d ed. 1971).
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reach the economic and social gains potentially available from pooling resources
in a commons.
However, where people have repeat dealings – typically the case with
relationships among commoners – cooperation does prove possible, even likely.
As Robert Axelrod famously demonstrated with his Tit-for-Tat strategy, people
may cooperate even with prisoner’s dilemma incentives (and without side
communication) once their interactions are turned into an indefinite game.
Axelrod defines his strategy to require “avoidance of unnecessary conflict by
cooperating as long as the other player cooperates, provocability in the face of
an uncalled-for defection by the other, forgiveness after responding to a
provocation, and clarity of behavior so that the other player can adapt to your
pattern of action.”98 As Axelrod explains, this happy result “requires that
individuals have a sufficiently large chance to meet again so that they have a stake
in their future interaction.”99 The ability to remember and retaliate makes noncooperative moves individually counter-productive, and thus may induce selfinterested cooperation, even in a commons.100
But this happy scenario may, in turn, pose a stumbling block for our
theory. Previous commentators noted that for cooperative results to emerge, the
game must repeat indefinitely.101 A repeated interaction with a finite ending may
still yield tragedy, because each participant knows that the last move will
resemble a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma in which defection is the dominant
strategy. Knowing that others will defect on their last move creates a domino
effect through earlier interactions, so that defection becomes the dominant
strategy for everyone from the outset.102
Consider how a strong right of exit affects the likelihood of an efficient
commons, at least within the artificial world of game theory (assuming, for the
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See id. at 126-132; see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE A CTION 145-50, 164-67
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See A NTHONY DE JASEY, SOCIAL CONTRACT , FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC
GOODS PROBLEM 63-66 (1990); Rose, supra note 41, at 51 n.49.
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See, e.g., R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102
(1957). For certain (partial) solutions, see HARDIN, supra note 100, at 173-87, 211-13
(suggesting ways in which varied, but overlapping, interactions can provide opportunities
for meaningful sanctions, the knowledge necessary to cooperate, and a rough simulation
of an infinitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game).
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moment, voracious, unsocialized commoners).103 Strong exit allows each
commoner an unwaivable right to leave the commons at any moment. But each
commoner also knows that others can also leave at any moment, raising a serious
concern for those who want to stay put. The stay-putters worry what may
happen between the moment the foot-out-the-door folks decide to leave and the
moment they actually exit. During the interim, the stay-putters may continue to
cooperate, but the foot-out-the-door folks are now playing a transitory and
short-lived game. The stay-putters may worry that, during the interim period,
which can happen at any time, the foot-out-the-door folks will take advantage
of them, either by over-exploiting or under-investing in the commons resource.
Still, in many contexts, unilateral uncertainty regarding when others might
leave need not frustrate cooperation. 104 Vigilant commoners can react to noncooperative moves by retaliating promptly, thus limiting the risk of exploitation
and making cooperation stable. Two features of long-term cooperation in
managing commons resources make vigilant retaliation an unsatisfying response
for our purposes. First, the benefits to commoners can vary substantially from
time to time. Therefore, each potential stay-putter may suspect that the others
will defect precisely when their private benefits are particularly high. If defection
at any given moment proves more advantageous than continuous cooperation,
then the possibility of retaliating later can not mitigate the harm that foot-out-thedoor folks can inflict with well-timed defections. Not wanting to be a sucker,
stay-putters may behave as if they too are foot-out-the-door folks.105
There is another, more prosaic reason why strong exit threatens
commons prosperity. Commoners may have independent or exogenous reasons
to exit; they may leave because of familial, professional, or other reasons that
have nothing to do with timing advantageous defection. But after they decide to
leave for such reasons, the erstwhile stay-putters now have a strong incentive to
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By itself, a commitment to exit does not yet challenge the desirability of common
ownership. On the contrary, insofar as common ownership can be freed from the risks of
Hardian tragedy and become beneficial to the actors involved, its facilitation rather
enriches the variety of choices available to people and allows them benefits they perhaps
could not have obtained absent such an alternative.
For instance, in the antitrust context, collusive agreements can be stable. See
RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, A NTITRUST 336-38 (2d ed. 1981).
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behave like foot-out-the-door folks in timing their intended exit.106 And the
others, more precisely, every commoner, face again the same troubling question:
why restrain yourself now if your commoners may choose their moment to take
the most and run? Even prompt retaliation may not solve the challenge that
strong rights of exit pose to efficient use of a commons.
A theory of a liberal commons requires two elements: strong (but not
unlimited) exit and the possibility of realizing economic and social gains from
shared use of scarce resources. But simple game theory reasoning helps
formalize the familiar intuition that these elements may work at cross-purposes.
The structure of commons interactions offers only partial solutions to the threat
posed by exit. If so, then an efficient, liberal commons may not be a realistic
possibility. How can law resolve the seeming impasse?
4. Putting Law in Its Place. –
a. Law as Safety Net That Catalyzes Trust. Consider for a moment
the seeming paradox that an efficient liberal regime of private property is itself,
oddly, a type of commons held together by virtue of the law’s facilitation.107 By
constraining individual opportunism, law proves effective as one mode of social
organization that helps overcome collective action problems inherent in creating
and maintaining private property. Using law to build an efficient liberal commons
is not so different.
To start, we join with commons property scholars who have shown so
persuasively how political and social institutions can affect the costs and benefits
facing commons owners in their attempts to organize themselves.108 They show
how “generalized institutional-choice and conflict-resolution” mechanisms
together with “substantial local autonomy” can facilitate and sustain commons
property regimes.109 After getting to this point, however, the existing literature
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Notice the difference between the two reas ons why exit threatens successful
commons property. The first reason requires a unique payoff structure in which the
variations between gains in different times are so great that defection destabilizes
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invariably compromises exit.110 Committed, as we believe most people in our
polity are, to the fundamental right of exit, our path leads instead through the
thicket of law towards a theory of a liberal commons. Law can serve two
functions: to provide the infrastructure of liberal commons institutions and to
supply anti-opportunistic devices that reassure prospective commoners that they
will not be abused for cooperating. By adopting a straightforward collection of
substantive and procedural rules, liberal commons forms can encourage
prosperity and cooperation without unnecessarily sacrificing exit.
Law should be understood to work as a set of background rules,
always in operation, but seldom overtly manifest in the daily life of commons
resource management.111 Formal law is often not powerful enough, by itself,
directly to establish the trust, cooperation, and mutual reliance any successful
commons requires for the day-to-day routines of self-governance. Commoners
generally will not deploy law on a regular basis with each other, partly because
people often perceive recourse to law as unnecessary, unneighborly, even hostile
in ongoing relationships of trust and cooperation. 112 The routine operation of a
commons resource and the day-to-day cooperation among the commoners are
directly governed usually through informal, social interactions – perhaps law-like
in their own right – but not by formal legal rules.113 Social norms and other
modes of social organization and structure, but not formal law, govern most daily
interactions.
With that caveat, well-designed background legal rules are nevertheless
crucial for the success of any liberal commons. As we discussed above, the right
of exit poses a fundamental challenge to commons success: for many resources,
the unilateral right to leave may invite opportunistic behavior and lead people to
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See sources discussed supra at Section I.C.
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The background trust-building role we envision for law, as stated in the text, can
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understanding of the way law generally (and not only law regarding common ownership)
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be on their guard, distrustful, and overly quick to retaliate. The background rules
we propose can temper these instincts primarily by creating a formal “safety net”
that enables commoners to gain the benefits that flow from trusting one another,
but without taking prohibitive individual risks. The simple existence of wellcrafted background rules, rather than their daily invocation, facilitates
commoners’ efforts to establish and maintain liberal commons property.
While commoners are unlikely to bother learning the rules of (low
visibility) law, their ignorance of the law does not excuse its modest but important
role. The myriad details of the law do not matter individually, but rather jointly
because together they suggest to people an animating spirit of that body of law.
For law to affect behavior, we do not assume widespread knowledge of any
doctrinal detail, only that people generally believe that if things turn ugly, the law
will serve as one form of social organization that protects them against extreme
abuse and exploitation.
More precisely, the constellation of background rules that should govern
a liberal commons must minimize incentives to abuse the inter-personal trust and
cooperation necessary for success. Thus, liberal commons property forms can
enable individuals safely to enter into relationships of mutual reliance that they
may otherwise perceive as too risky. In an imperfect world, where we can never
absolutely trust one another, background legal rules can function as one effective
social organizational form that reinforces each commoner’s trust in others and
willingness to cooperate without focusing on the grave vulnerability such trust can
engender.114 By generating the so-called social capital of shared norms, trust
reduces the costs of monitoring and sanctioning activities.115
Background law that catalyzes trust is, for us, one essential substitute
for restrictions on exit that can also make commons ownership work efficiently.

See H.L.A. HART , T HE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961); HARDIN, supra note 27, at 18586 (“[T]he possibility of sanction is valuable for letting the well-intentioned, who do not
require sanctions, risk being cooperative on the secure knowledge that those with whom
they come to interact are similarly well-intentioned.”); Jeremy Waldron, When Justice
Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights , i n L IBERAL RIGHTS 370, 373-74, 376, 385, 387
(1993); Carol M. Rose, Trust as the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 537-38, 540-41,
546, 550 (1995); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Nor m s , 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1793-94 (1996)
(“[T]he transactor may find it desirable to include terms in the contract that are the best
terms if the other transactor turns out to be untrustworthy, while making extralegal
commitments, many of which will, over time, ripen into self-enforcing agreements, that will
govern the relationship if the other party turns out to be trustworthy.”).
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Building trust is a precondition, but also an outcome. Just as trust secures
success, so success reinforces trust – a virtuous circle where trust, as Philip Pettit
claims, “builds on trust” and may “grow with use.”116
b. The Penalty Default Alternative. – Consider for a moment one
possible objection to using law as a safety net and catalyst: facilitative default
rules could be, in the long run, counterproductive.117 According to this view, by
making cooperation relatively risk-free, facilitative default rules could induce
cooperators into making sub-optimal investments in screening other potential
cooperators and in learning how to cooperate better among themselves.
Restated, the law should have no strong reason to promote ownership and
management of commons resources unless the commoners could agree up front
on their governance structure, without the assistance of legal mediation. If they
could not agree on initial terms, it is unlikely they could agree on much else, and
therefore it would be better ex ante if potential cooperators did not invest in a
cooperative scheme which would be doomed to fail, in any event.118 This
objection is pertinent for us because we argue that liberal commons success must
rely primarily on the parties’ ability to cooperate without the daily summons of
legal rules. If this claim is right, then penalty default rules – rules that make trust
and reliance risky absent an explicit ex ante agreement regarding the terms of
cooperation – are better than the facilitative regime we advocate.119
But insofar as common ownership is concerned, the penalty default
objection is probably wrong, and the contextual tradeoff between facilitating
cooperation and encouraging caution in entering into cooperation leads us to
prefer the facilitative regime. To see why, consider the way these two competing
regimes affect the behavior of ordinary, “mid-level” cooperators, the
overwhelming majority who must be the main target of a legal regime that
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Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB . A FF . 202, 207, 209-10 (1995).
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W e are grateful to our colleague Jim Krier for challenging us on this front and
helping us respond to this challenge.
See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 464, 478 (1995); see also Smith, supra
note 31, at 167 (making a similar claim).
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On penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989)
(“[P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want – in order to
encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties”).
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purports to encourage liberal commons property. 120 Given that “learning to
cooperate better” is itself a (second-order) collective good for the
commoners,121 it is difficult to see how a regime of penalty default rules would
ever generate happy outcomes, rather it would exacerbate the downward circle
of distrust. On the other hand, even a facilitative regime actually does not
guarantee risk-free cooperation because law is always imperfect and must
always be invoked by an injured party. 122 Thus, the cost for cooperation of a
facilitative regime – in terms of under-investment in caution and in self-education
– is smaller than the penalty default objection assumes and is, in any event,
outweighed by the benefit of allowing mid-level cooperators to “play the game”
at all.
In all, we view the role of law as constrained, but indispensable. If the
goals of a liberal commons are to be achieved, law can play no more, but no
less, than a background function, by serving to catalyze and protect the trust that
governs day-to-day cooperation. With this understanding of the goals of the
liberal commons, and the proper role of law, we now turn to the core of our
theory.
B. The Three Spheres of a Liberal Commons
When people trade their precious, if illusory, “sole despotic dominion”
for a share in a liberal commons regime, what do they get? First, they generally
retain the ability to make certain autonomous decisions regarding use of the
commons resource, what we call the “sphere of individual dominion.” Second,
they gain a voice, along with their fellow commoners, in collective decisionmaking regarding use of the resource, the feature we call the “sphere of
democratic self-governance.” And, third, they retain the secure right to exit if

120

A regime that encourages ownership and management of commons resources
must focus on its effects mainly on mid-level cooperators because especially-goodcooperators may well succeed in effectively working together irrespective of the legal
regime and uniquely-bad-cooperators would fail in any event. (Further, insofar as for midlevel cooperators cooperation is itself a reward, but for bad cooperators it isn’t, the latter
are unlikely to bid as high as the former to join.) The only important prescription regarding
bad cooperators is that the law should allow – maybe even encourage – the others to
exclude them. As the text below explains, this can be done without adopting a regime of
penalty default rules.
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See Krier, supra note 41, at 337-39.
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See Rose, supra note 114, at 554-56.
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they are dissatisfied or are no longer interested in cooperating, but a right
modified to respect certain community concerns, what we call “the sphere of
cooperation-enhancing exit.” These three features – the spheres of individual
dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit –
comprise the ideal-typical or general form of any liberal commons.
It is the necessary confluence of these three features that the liberal
commons form highlights and the existing private/commons and
liberty/community binaries hide. No real-world institution incorporates all these
features; rather we see approximations, more or less well-adapted to the liberal
commons goals of promoting the gains from cooperation while securing the
benefits flowing from strong exit.123
1. The Sphere of Individual Dominion. – In one sense or another, all
three features of the liberal commons, elaborated in the following pages, are
aimed at facilitating trust and cooperation (strengthening social values) and
generating prosperous use (maximizing economic gain). For methodological
reasons, we start with the most elementary background rules; describing a set of
default rules that govern the domain of individual action. These rules seek to
ensure that individual use of the commons resource does not yield tragic
outcomes. More particularly, these rules counter three forms of inefficient
behavior regarding commons resources: (1) over-use, (2) under-investment, and
(3) wasteful struggles regarding the fruits and revenues that a commons may
produce. Together, these rules govern the sphere of autonomous decisionmaking reserved to each commoner; the actions he or she may take without
seeking permission from fellow commoners. These rules apply only absent a
majority decision, and are thus intentionally minimalist in their scope and
aspiration.
We assume that the commons’ democratic self-governance institutions,
discussed in our next section, generate more refined injunctions for beneficialuse,
and that the default rules we describe here apply only to relatively marginal
issues, which do not justify or require the invocation of collective decision-
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Recall that to be usefully analyzed in the liberal commons framework, an
institution must be one in which the calculus of utility comprises incommensurable goals,
participation is of the essence, and the terms for exit matter. See supra page 2. These
admittance criteria circumscribe the problems which any liberal commons form must solve
and hence correspond with the three spheres we discuss in the text. The first sphere
allows some divergence between individual and social use; the second sphere promotes
participation; the third sphere protects liberty.
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making. It is nonetheless important to appreciate the way even these rules can
facilitate trust, cooperation, and efficiency.
a. Policing Over-Use. Let us start with mechanisms that protect
against over-use (leaving aside non-legal modes of social organization that may
accomplish similar ends). We see two, complementary approaches to
intervention: first, directly regulating commoners’ behavior through broad but
vague default rules, and second, indirectly encouraging proper cost
internalization by establishing tough default rules that give commoners the
confidence to trust each other in daily interactions.124
1. Direct Regulation. Successful commons property regimes often
create detailed, explicit regulations restricting and channeling use. To ensure
people take appropriate care in exploiting the commons environment, such rules
typically are designed to be easily enforceable, for example, by imposing
escalating punishments.125 Furthermore, these regulations tend to be cautious
with regard to current exploitation of the commons resource.126 Conservative
limits on exploitation may impose some current efficiency costs, but nevertheless
result in overall efficiency gains. By shifting commoners’ discount rates so that
future returns become more valuable, these rules make continuous cooperation
more attractive now.
These two injunctions – escalating punishments and conservative
consumption – require detailed regulation. However, the more tailored these
rules are to specific resources, the less likely they often are to serve as a default
legal regime. If a default legal regime aims to regulate activity directly, the best
it can do is to handle a wide range of resources tolerably well. For example,
direct regulation can set general standards of reasonable use, such as a rule
restricting each commoner to uses that accord with the others’ expectations, and
then leave the door open to local adjustments the parties may make to tailor
resource use to their specific circumstances. Usually, the default rule of the
direct approach involves ratifying existing uses as a baseline and enjoining
creation of major barriers to reasonable new uses. Given the inescapable
vagueness of such default rules, they will not likely be effective anti-opportunistic
devices of the sort we seek.
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A s an aside, the success of the medieval open-field system seems due, in part, to
communal regulation of the fields’ use according to the two forms we explore in the text
below. Cf. Smith, supra note 31, at 132, 136-37.
125
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2. Indirect Encouragement. To be effective, the operative background
rules that prevent over-exploitation must be sharper and more precise; in
particular, they must guarantee that if trust collapses, then the costs of each
commoner’s use will be properly internalized, neutralizing ex ante the incentives
for over-use. One plausible rule can be simply stated: every commoner is liable
to the others for the fair market value of every use calculated pro rata (that
is, according to ownership share).
We say this rule is plausible, but its usefulness depends on the context.
Fair market value liability may not necessarily suffice to deter excessive use,
especially in cases where the visibility of exploitation efforts is low. There,
potential violators can count on some measure of under-enforcement. They may
reasonably expect some probability that deviance will not be spotted if
monitoring is relaxed, as we expect it to be, until a major deviance is spotted.
Also, evidentiary problems may arise because earlier excess uses may be harder
and more costly to identify, a cost aggravated if catching extreme exploiters also
requires settling the accounts of other, lesser extreme exploiters. In contexts
where the under-deterrence concern is significant, a more stringent remedy may
be better tailored to achieve liberal commons goals, especially where even lowlevel exploitation is intolerable. Such a remedy could be based on the violator’s
gain, that is, the fruits and benefits derived from overuse of the commons.
Removing ex post the possibility of profit from detected infringements makes
overuse somewhat less valuable ex ante and thus may more effectively deter
violations.127
On its face, the fair market liability formula we propose, or its plausible
alternatives, may seem impractical because calculating the liabilities for overuse
would impose high administrative costs. But recall that we intend this rule to
work in the background; we doubt if parties in a well-functioning commons
would routinely turn to such strict accounting rules. Commoners would likely
perceive a cold accounting for each use (or for each investment) to be
inappropriate in an ongoing relationship of cooperative interaction, mutual trust,

See HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT : A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC
VALUES 18 (1997). To be sure, even with this remedy there is still a chance that the
infringement will go undetected or that the other commoners will fail to pursue their claim,
which makes the violator’s expected gain greater than zero. Nevertheless, the recovery of
the violator’s gains makes the detection of infringements – even of past infringements –
relatively more worthwhile to the other commoners. See id.
127
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and group solidarity.128 Rather we expect to find, following Robert Ellickson’s
account, that daily interactions would be governed by a more informal, rough
mental account of outstanding credits and debits.129 So long as the aggregate
account is not radically unbalanced and future interactions can provide adequate
opportunities for evening up, commoners may not be concerned if particular subaccounts are not balanced.130
So, the precise accounting mechanism we suggest is not intended to
serve the commoners on a daily basis. Its purpose and method is different,
consistent with our view of the trust-catalyzing role of law. Such a rule assures
each commoner that even if the commons breaks down, no party will be too
vulnerable to another’s exploitation. By assuring enforcement of a precise
accounting if the commons fails, the law can enable owners to trust one another
and to rely on each other’s cooperation in the meanwhile.131 This trust, to be
sure, is not completely cost-free fromthe commoners’ perspective. Invoking the
anti-opportunism mechanism requires the commoners to invest some amount in
monitoring each other. Law can facilitate the parties’ trust, but it cannot – and
probably should not – entirely displace the need for some caution against trusting
others too much.132 This indirect legal mechanism, even if imperfect, plays its
role by relaxing the parties’ own monitoring reflexes, by making monitoring
cheaper, and by lessening too-quick resort to formal law, the types of actions
that cause others to become suspicious, which in turn undermines trust and
cooperation. 133
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ELLICKSON, supra note 112, at 234-36.

Id. at 56 ; See also Bernstein, supra note 114, at 1765-68 (arguing that trade
association members rely on informal accounting during ongoing dealing, strict legal
accounting during end game).
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ELLICKSON, supra note 112, at 56.

See Omri Ben-Shahar, Rights Eroding From Past Breach, 1 A MER. L. & ECON.
REV. 190 (2000). But see McKean, supra note 4, at 273-74 (arguing that successful systems
“betray an intense concern with . . . bookkeeping to keep track of contributions and
withdrawals from the commons”).
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Rose, supra note 114, at 555.

Id. at 556-57. There is another possible objection to the accounting mechanism
we propose: our mechanism can never be perfect – and thus the over-use aspect of the
tragedy of the commons can never be fully overcome – because potential defectors will
always be able to get away with their opportunism if they overuse or damage the common
resource in unobservable or unverifiable ways. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts
(continued...)
133
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b. Preventing Under-Investment. Anti-opportunistic mechanisms
regarding the parties’ investment decisions are the mirror-image of “anti-overuse”
rules. Investment in a commons can be a public good with respect to other
commoners. Hence, it invites free-riding: individuals may refuse to pay their
share, motivated solely by the expectation that others’ efforts will generate the
same good free of charge (or more cheaply).134 Free-riding can generate underinvestment that would harm any commons, and would demoralize any
community.135 Therefore, unsurprisingly, well-functioning commons property
regimes set norms that require commoners to contribute their proportional share
for necessary services invested the commons.136
1. Preservation. A default legal regime seeking to facilitate liberal
commons success should formalize investment-protection norms through a rule
stating, first, that any commoner may unilaterally undertake any investment –
even if not urgent and with no requirement of the other commoners’ prior
approval – reasonably required to prevent harm to the resource and to protect
the commoners’ continued ownership or possession, and, second, the investing
party should be entitled to an immediate pro rata contribution from each
one of the other commoners.
The rule protects a cooperating commoner from the others’ possible
opportunism by insuring that parties who invest today will not be exploited
133

(...continued)
in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271, 279-80 (1992) (discussing the distinction between observable and verifiable
information). This critique postulates that there are many acts of individual commoners
that would be impossible – or, more likely, too costly – to observe or to prove in court
(even if observed). The critique further implies that a regime of private property (the sole
owner case) is free from this difficulty. We do not dispute that commons property regimes
face the difficulty of unobservable or unverifiable infringements. See Ellickson, supra note
15, at 1329 (comparing the effectiveness of barking dogs as boundary-infringement device
with the difficulty of designing commons shirking-detection mechanisms). But this
difficulty is not wholly absent with private property, trespassing must be policed a n d
licensees monitored. Therefore, if – or, better, in those cases where – the default rules we
propose can overcome the difficulties of collective action in controlling over-use by way
of observable and verifiable acts, the liberal commons is not different, in this respect, from
“Blackstonian” private property.
See Richard Arneson, The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92
ETHICS 616, 621 (1982).
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tomorrow. Like anti-overuse rules, our rule here serves a protective function,
to encourage parties to give cooperation a chance. The rule would be too
cumbersome to invoke on a daily basis, so such ongoing accounting would be
handled through the ordinary informal norms that we usually see. Given the
possibility of disputes regarding which preservation measures are “reasonably
required” along with concern that some commoners may lack immediate ability
to contribute, the law can back the contribution rule we propose with various
structural devices, such as insurance-like funds collected in advance that provide
some assurance of payment when disputes arise.
The investment-protection regime, like its anti-overuse complement (and
for the same reasons elaborated above), is supposed to function as a
background norm in the parties’ relationship, so its mere existence simultaneously
encourages efficient levels of investment (by inducing investments that would
have otherwise been too risky, too open to free-riding) and inculcates productive
trust among commoners.
2. Improvements. In designing a liberal commons, we should be
cautious to limit any contribution obligation.137 The obligation should not refrain
from including expenses aimed at preserving the commons as a whole. But
improvements may be different, though we recognize that the line between
improvements and simple preservation is murky. Still, to the extent they can be
adequately defined, improvements are more likely to deviate from the parties’
original understanding of their common endeavor, so we cannot be sure that
commoners who refuse to participate are trying to free ride, rather than
expressing their own subjective preferences and genuine valuations.138 Including
improvements in a broad right of contribution could offend the notion of

See g e n e r a l l y Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and
Injurious Industries, 75 NYU L. REV. 354, 385-90 (2000) (discussing restitutionary liability
for unilateral conferral of unsolicited benefits).
137
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A s Saul Levmore explains, individual valuations are idiosyncratic because they
depend on varying abilities to pay for a good and on personal tastes. Levmore gives three
exceptions where the phenomenon of subjective devaluation would not occur: (1) the
recipient has infinite wealth; (2) the recipient is a profit-making enterprise where subjective
preferences have little role; or (3) the non-bargained benefit is easily translated into wealth.
Unless those exceptions apply, one cannot easily refute the recipient’s claim that the
recipient preferred to invest money in the acquisition of some other benefit more clearly
to the recipient’s liking. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 74-79
(1985).
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individual choice inherent in a liberal commons.139 Such considerations seem to
us to justify postponing any right to contribution respecting improvements only
until exit, in particular exit that liquidates the commons and resolves concerns
arising from conflicting subjective valuations.140
To be sure, these “anti-underinvestment” rules are very minimalist and,
if applied broadly, rather crude and sub-optimal. Thus, on the one hand,
improvements may be part of the parties’ original understanding. And even
where they were not foreseen, improvements may be, in some cases, the most
beneficial course of action (for example investing in insurance now may be more
efficient than covering uninsured liabilities later). Similarly, on the other hand,
there are cases in which even repair is a losing proposition; some resources are
best left to deteriorate.141
These defects of our default rules would be fatal if they were intended
to apply to a wide range of investment decisions. However, recall that these
rules apply only in the sphere of individual dominion, that is, absent a majority
decision on preservation or investment. They constitute the (limited) realm of
action in which any single commoner can act on behalf of the group. Given that
a more ambitious regime regarding of investments and improvements is well
within the sphere of democratic decision-making we propose, it is reasonable to
restrict the realm of individual choice only to undisputed investments.142 Crude
139

For the proposition that awarding restitution for unsolicited benefits in cases of
subjective valuation insults the liberal commitment for individual free choice, see PETER
BIRKS , A N INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 109-10, 228 (paperback ed. with
revisions, 1989); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES Vol. I § 4.9(2) (2d ed. 1993); John D.
McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and the Law of Restitution, 16 OSGOODE L. REV.
515, 520 (1978); Mitchell McInnes, Incontrovertible Benefits in the S. Ct. of Canada; Peel
(Regional Municipality) v. Canada; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario, 23 CAN.
BUS . L.J. 122, 123, 128 (1994).
See Levmore, supra note 138, at 78 (“In partition the property is generally reduced
to monetary terms, often by sale. . . . The recipient, whose share of the improvement's
value is deducted from his share of the property's total value, cannot claim to have been
forced to purchase a good that he does not value, because he has received in partition the
monetary value of his share of the improvement.”)
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as it is, the preservation-improvement divide seems good enough given its limited
task.
c. Sharing Fruits and Revenues. Finally, we take up the problem of
distributing the products of a commons in a manner that ex ante encourages their
production. A basic principle that complies with the injunctions against over-use
and under-investment is that fruits and revenues should be distributed
proportionally to each commoner’s ownership share.143 But what should be the
rule where the revenues or fruits are not produced by all the commoners, rather
by one (or a few) of them? How divide up fruits and revenues when a
commoner makes an autonomous decision to use the commons resource?
Three solutions come to mind as default rules. One rule would allow the
laboring commoner to keep the entire net profit after paying the others the fair
market value for use of their shares. A second, diametrically opposed possibility
is to give the laboring commoner only a fair market return and distribute the
remaining net profits among all commoners (including the laborer) according to
their respective ownership shares. Or, an intermediate possibility would be to
allow the laborer to capture fair market value and the proportional share of net
profits attributable to the laborer, with all commoners (including the laborer)
splitting the remaining surplus.144
We see no general way to decide among these approaches. To the
extent we are concerned mostly with policing against under-investment, the first
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(...continued)
individual investme nt is reimbursable only when can be characterized as being about
protections against erosion, mainly because in this case there is unlikely to be differences
in subjective valuations.
Such is indeed the practice of successful commons regimes. See McKean, supra
note 4, at 264-65.
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Assume, for example, that there are two commoners, that the fair market value of
the u s e of the resource as a whole (say, a parcel of land) is 40, that the fair market value of
the pertinent work is 10, and that the net profits (after deduction of all the expenses
involved including the fair market value of the laborer’s work) is 100. The first option
would give the passive commoner 20 (50% of the fair market value of the parcel’s use), and
leave the laborer 80. The second rule would give both parties 50 (so that the laborer does
not get any special benefit excepting the 10 fair market value directly attributable to her
work). The third rule would allocate 20% of the net profits to “work” and 80% to “land,”
thus allowing the passive commoner to receive 40 (50% of what has been alloca t e d t o
“land”) and the laborer 60 (50% of what has been allocated to “land” as well as that part
of the net profits which has been allocated to “work”).
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rule seems preferable to the second (and, to a lesser degree, the third).145 But,
as we indicated above, the second rule performs best in ameliorating over-use.
Also, by extending the jurisdiction of group decision-making to include the labor
that any member invests in the commons property, the second rule seems better
designed to inculcate the sense of common undertaking crucial for wellfunctioning commons. While choosing among these choices requires the sort of
context-dependent analysis attentive to micro and macro values we discussed
earlier, all the choices can fall within the range bounded by the liberal commons
framework.
2. The Sphere of Democratic Self-Governance. –
a. The Virtues of Mobilizing Voice. So far, we have focused on
mechanisms that counteract the potentially devastating effects that individual
autonomy may have on the efficiency – even the viability – of commons property.
At a minimum, within a sphere of individual dominion, owners can benefit from
the commons resource. Now we become more ambitious and explore
affirmative ways to support the commoners’ cooperation, starting with possible
rules for democratic self-governance. These rules can help potential commoners
capture both the economic benefits that a viable commons engenders (pooling,
joint management, risk-spreading) and the social gratifications it generates (the
psychological rewards of belonging, membership, and collective action). Recall
that in many circumstances the economic and the social goods are intimately
related because efficiency, trust, and cooperation tend to be mutually reinforcing.
Our prescriptions draw on findings from social science studies of
successful, though illiberal, commons. These studies suggest to us that
democratic self-governance with a large role for majority rule is preferable to
unanimity rules. By requiring complete agreement on management issues and by
emboldening holdouts, unanimity rules may lead to anticommons tragedy, that is,
mutual vetoes that waste a resource through underuse.146 We believe a regime
of direct democracy – appropriately modified to work in our liberal framework
– would best serve the individualand the group in managing a commons resource

See Lawrence Berger, A n Analysis of the Economic Relationship Between
Cotenants, 21 A RIZ. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 (1979) (describing the first rule as “clearly aimed
at the reward of the [the owner’s] present efforts in maximizing the utility of the land”);
Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, Co-Ownership of Patents: A Comparative and
Economic View, 72 J. PATENT & T RADEMARK OFF . SOC ’Y. 586, 595-96 (1990) (preferring the
first rule for co-ownership of patents for similar reasons).
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in a way that maximizes efficient use and enriches social relationships. Our
regime gives voice to each individual commoner and gives the commoners as a
group the power to tailor management and use of the commons resource to
changing environmental, economic, and social circumstances.
The mechanisms we propose amplify each commoner’s ability to change
commons management from within. Resorting to “voice,” rather than
immediately moving to “exit,” requires disgruntled parties to have some measure
of loyalty toward their fellow commoners.147 However, the predisposition to
loyalty is not sufficient absent structural arrangements that facilitate effective
voice.148 As Hirschman explains, “the decision whether to exit will often be
taken in light of the prospects of the effective use of voice.”149 Furthermore,
he notes that, “voice is essentially an art constantly evolving in new
directions.”150 Therefore, so long as strong exit is possible – and we insist that
it always be possible – exit proves an easy response to dissatisfaction, and it
tends to dominate voice.151 A default regime of democratic self-governance that
promotes participation is required to direct commoners to opt for voice first and
to use exit only as a last resort.
Voice is an important medium for community-building. Deliberation over
daily decisions concerning the management of the commons resource affords
commoners an opportunity to engage in dialogue. In this dialogue, the
commoners may attempt to synthesize their divergent experiences and
preferences while reaching a collective decision.152 Such experience is a means
of socialization, one that helps refine the commoners’ values and inculcates
collective commitments. Thus, the sphere of democratic self-governance is
significant not only because it may result instrumentally in more efficient decisions.
It is also important to inculcate the non-economic goal of cooperation, enriching
the commoners’ interpersonal relationships and solidifying their interpersonal
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62, at 77 (Loyalty makes exit less likely and increases
the likelihood of voice).
147

See id. at 82 (“While loyalty postpones exit, its very existence is predicated on the
possibility of exit.”).
148

149

Id. at 37.

150

Id. at 43.

151

See id. at 36-43.

Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 346-48 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
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capital. Democratic self-governance requires attention to both jurisdictional
boundary norms and procedural rules.
b. Jurisdictional Boundary Norms. Successful commons regimes,
Ostrom reports, are characterized by “collective-choice arrangements” that allow
most individuals affected by the operational rules to “participate in modifying the
operational rules.”153 These arrangements allow that “the individuals who directly
interact with one another and with the physical world can modify the rules over
time so as to better fit them to the specific circumstances of their setting.”154
Applying Ostrom’s prescription within a legal regime for a liberal
commons is not easy. In particular, difficult decisions arise respecting how to
determine the boundaries of group jurisdiction, that is, the scope of decisions
governed by a democratic governance regime. On one side, the need for
dynamic management and the problem of anticommons tragedy, both point
toward a relatively broad majority-rule jurisdiction. Broad majority-rule
jurisdiction also seems to correspond well within a social context of trust and
cooperation, one that understands the group, rather than its individual members,
as the ultimate owner of the commons resource. On the other side, however, a
liberal commons – like liberal regimes generally – must be aware of the risks of
majority rule and set jurisdictional boundaries that mitigate these risks. Majority
rule easily turns into minority exploitation. And the risk of minority exploitation
tends, as we have seen, to frustrate ab initio the possibility of trust and
cooperation and instead to make exit the commoner’s dominant route to
protecting autonomy. Therefore, a grant of broad jurisdictional scope to the
majority must be limited by protections against abuses arising from broad
jurisdiction.
These two guidelines may seem vague and contradictory, but we think
that they can be reasonably clarified. The goal is to prescribe jurisdictional
boundaries that would minimize conflict between majority and minority
interests.155 One approach could be to allow majority rule in a broad realm of
management and investment decisions – including giving the majority the power
153

See OSTROM, supra note 4, at 93.
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Id.
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These boundaries have been extensively debated in many contexts, such as
procedures for granting variances from public zoning schemes, for judicial review of
decisions by residential associations, or in decision rules in partnerships or close
corporations. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, 8 Cal. 4th 361
(CA Sup. Ct. 1984); Restatement (Third) of Servitudes §§ 3.8 (C.D. No. 8, 1997) (discussing
standards of judicial review of condominium association decisions).
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to lease or mortgage the commons resource or to make extensive and substantial
investments (or to decide upon divestment) – so long as the majority focuses on
increasing the size of the collective utility pie. Such an increase in the majority
power, however, increases the risk they will exploit the minority, so we would
also prescribe sharper limits on majority sovereignty whenever decisions are
more easily characterized as redistributive, particularly when they shift utilityfrom
the minority to the majority.
A knotty problem arises in evaluating the validity of a majority decision
to leave the commons resource unused. What counts as the baseline of use or
non-use is a difficult question that has been extensively debated in the nuisance,
takings, and land use literatures, and will not be recapitulated here.156 However,
in most cases, a decision to stop using the commons can reasonably be deemed
outside the domain of the majority rule, because it does not usually maximize the
commoners’ utility, and is likely to be a strategically motivated move to impair
the minority’s welfare expectations. A distributive intention to freeze the minority
out should render the majority’s decision illegitimate, thus the application of
majority decision-making there would be invalid. But a majority may be able to
redeem its non-use decision if they can show utility-maximizing reasons.
In many cases, a utility-maximizing reason could be based on an
efficiency calculus, such as a showing that there exist market conditions under
which current use would generate losses, or a demonstration that a “time-out”
is economically useful for paying off debts and searching for alternative low cost
uses.157 Efficiency, to be sure, should not be the only consideration that can
legitimate majority decisions. Other utility-maximizing considerations – such as
environmental conservation, or a simple preference for realizing revenue later, or
different levels of risk tolerance – can also render majority decisions legitimate.
But making an efficiency showing suggests, at least to a point, that the majority
decision is not motivated by strategic exploitation of the minority. Judges or
arbiters may be able to improve on an efficiency analysis by also evaluating
evidence more directly related to commoners’ subjective utility functions.
Judgments about subjective utilityare bound to require complicated assessments
because utility is both wealth-dependent and taste-dependent. But messy as
See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundation of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-97 (1967);
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,
112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1011-12 (1999).
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Furthermore, it may well be that in such a case it is the minority’s insistence to
continue an inefficient (and positively harmful) use which is strategic.
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these judgements are, they are no different from myriad other legal rules that
invoke – usually implicitly – utilitarian balancing.
Finally, we do not privilege the founding commoners’ original intent
regarding the majority’s decision-making jurisdiction (unless, obviously, such
intent has been enshrined by certain constitutional agreements). Success in the
liberal commons context – as with private and commons property – requires
dynamic adjustments to changing circumstances. Hence, there is an inevitable
risk that the preferences of the collectivity would, at some point, substantially shift
away from those of certain minority members.158 As long as the minority has not
been exploited – in other words, absent prohibited redistributive motivations or
consequences – and given the minority’s ability to exit, we do not think that a
liberal commons should incorporate any conservative bias.
c. Procedural Norms. Margaret McKean provides a rich account of
procedural norms for democratic self-governance. In successful commons
regimes, she reports, commoners convene regularly in a deliberative body to
make decisions about opening and closing the commons, set harvest dates,
decide rules governing the commons, and also adjudicate conflicts among
themselves.159 These bodies, as she describes them, seem to operate typically
along republican democratic lines.160 Not only is power decentralized so that
there is no hierarchy separating “leadership” (even if elected) from “citizens,”161
but also there often appears to be significant emphasis on collective deliberation.
To ensure adherence to the decisions the group adopts, deliberative bodies pay
attention to the views of all eligible users of the commons.162 Although formally
majoritarian, these bodies in practice usually foster consensual decision-
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See also Gillette, supra note 83, at 1425.

See McKean, supra note 4, at 258-59. These bodies had reasons to convene other
than management of the commons . As McKean explains, this made management more
efficient by lessening the transaction costs of assembling for these purposes. See id. at
260.
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See generally Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1591

(1988).
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See Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1350.

See McKean, supra note 4, at 260-61. As McKean explains, “[d]isgruntled
violators...could begin to free-ride... or to shirk... if they felt that the maintenance of the
commons was no longer in their interest because the rules were unfair. And they could
free-ride as individuals even if they could not overcome the collective action dilemma in
order to demand changes in governance of the commons.” See id.
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making.163 Democratic governance operates as a background rule, while daily
decision-making in the absence of deeply-held dissent is governed by a social
norm of unanimity. This background/operational split legitimates and promotes
consensus but does not create a formal anticommons structure, with its attendant
tragedy.
Republican democratic governance can only be viable in social
environments characterized by trust and cooperation. In other settings, such as
the paradigm of a public corporation, republicanism may be both unnecessary
and too costly. A hierarchical governance structure with formal indirect
democracy may better facilitate the parties’ collective action.164 But notice again,
that direct governance in the appropriate social context is more likely to develop
the trust and cooperation it requires and to facilitate and encourage members’
participation. Participatory democracy can intensify the parties’ inter-personal
relations; so republicanism, with its attendant limitation on the size of the
commoners’ group, is an important institutional mechanism for communitybuilding. Inter-personal relations and community, in turn, reinforce trust and
facilitate cooperation.
These lessons can be incorporated into a legal regime of a liberal
commons. Along with recourse to majority rule rather than to administration by
elected officials, a liberal commons regime committed to republican democratic
governance would require prescriptions respecting disclosure, consultation, and
fair hearing. Before majorities act, they should disclose relevant facts that
arguably justify the proposed action and make room for open discussion by
dissenting parties in a forum where all sides must listen to opponents’ views and
give reasons for their stances. Finally, minority complaints of due process
deprivations or substantive exploitationshould be capable of triggering mediation
or judicial intervention.
These mechanisms significantly facilitate successful liberal commons
property. Procedural safeguards calm parties’ concern that others will maneuver
behind their backs. They recruit the judiciary to support the parties’ cooperation
by serving as a forum for dispute resolution that can “provide solutions that
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See id. at 261.

See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional
Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL. STUD. 25, 34-36 (1991)
(describing how landlords, contracting separately with each tenant, may be better able to
maximize aggregate tenant preferences than cooperatives or condominiums).
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permit [them] to end their quarrels and to get on with their lives.”165 And where
no such reconciliation is possible, a court can be advised to order dissolution of
the commons, because for hostile parties ownership and managements of
commons resources is bound to yield tragedy. Finally, the requirement of openminded consultation – although difficult to enforce because the majority can often
carry it out in a purely superficial way – facilitates republican social norms
because it provides commoners with standards and guides for conduct and
judgment they each can expect the others will generally follow in a social context
generally governed by cooperation and mutual trust.166
d. Promoting Tailor-Made Adjustments. The rules we have
discussed so far provide a starting point for people who inadvertently become
commoners and for those who would voluntarily become commoners if they did
not have to incur the costs of custom-tailoring their default legal regime through
contract. But for commoners who can bear some contracting costs, background
rules supporting freedom of contract can provide another, simple method of legal
facilitation for a successful commons.
To prosper, the commoners must be relatively free from the authority of
outside bodies in managing the commons, a freedom McKean calls “independent
jurisdiction.”167 Providing “substantial local autonomy”168 is an easy, but crucially
important, way to supplement the more active methods of commons property
facilitation we have already discussed. The web of default background rules –
significant up to a point – cannot by its nature be sufficient for every case of
commons property, because each resource carries unique features.
Therefore, alongside withthe law’s active support for commons property
via anti-opportunistic and institution-building rules, the law should also offer what
may be called passive support, that is, the law should reflect a liberal approach
respecting the content of any private “constitutional arrangements” commoners
may wish to adopt. So long as exit is appropriately preserved (within the limits

Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991)
(discussing the dispute resolution function of law).
165

Cf. HART , supra note 114, at 79-88 (discussing law as a source of reas o n s f o r
action); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal
Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429
(1978) (describing the difficulty of controlling behavior through “aspirational commands”
from legislatures or courts).
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See McKean, supra note 4, at 259.
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OSTROM, supra note 4, at 212.
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set below), and provided third parties are not injured,169 then the law should
allow people to agree ex ante on whatever constitutional arrangements they
prefer respecting rights and obligations regarding the resource, its management
and use, or rules for dissolution. By adding a liberal approach to contracting,
people can tailor their default rules so that they are ever more responsive to
particular resource needs, technological changes, and evolving local norms.170
3. The Sphere of Cooperation-Enhancing Exit. –
a. The Many Faces of Exit. Appropriate mechanisms of antiopportunistic guarantees and democratic self-governance begin to move
ownership and management of commons resources away from its mythological
tragic predicament; well-calibrated cooperation-enhancing exit completes the
story. Unlike commons success stories that sacrifice exit to build community, a
liberal commons preserves a commitment to individual exit. Indefinite
restrictions of exit cannot be legitimized in a liberal commons.
Exit, however, is not a unitary concept, although it is frequently and
mistakenly treated as such. Sometimes, freedom to alienate one’s share is
sufficient to protect exit; other times, nothing short of dissolution will do –
dissolution rules include, to name a few examples, partition in co-ownership law,
divorce in family law, termination of trusts or partnerships, and liquidation of
corporations. Furthermore, for both alienation and dissolution, there exists a
range of liberal commons mechanisms that serve community-preserving functions
without substantially compromising liberalcommitments. These mechanisms help
insure that that the exiter’s decision is informed (not hasty and ignorant) and
sincere (not opportunistic), thus refining the class of protected exit-decisions from
a liberal standpoint. These mechanisms also help craft the right to exit consistent
with preserving cooperation.
b. Restraints Can Enhance Cooperation. Just like rules governing
daily life in a commons, exit rules do not serve as operative regulatory norms.
But they can serve, like in the spheres of individual dominion and democratic
self-governance, as background rules whose mere existence protects the
commoners from defection, abuse of trust, and exploitation. If so, cooperationpromoting exit rules may be tuned so they contribute to common ownership
169

Where land is at issue, one such possible limitation from negative externalities can
derive from the prescriptions set out by land-use law regarding parcels’ minimal size and
width of a parcel. See Heller, supra note 51, at 1173-74.
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Private constitutions raise several questions that cannot be properly addressed
here, regarding both the outer limits of freedom of contract (especially in contexts that may
raise concerns of systematic exploitation) and the possibility of unwritten constitutions.
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success, and maybe even support its establishment ex ante. To function as antiopportunistic mechanisms, alienation and dissolution rules should safeguard
commoners from unjust deprivation of utility by other commoners.171 Hence,
these rules should contain an injunction against redistribution, ensuring a
scrupulous allotment of the resource or its worth corresponding to the parties’
initial (and subsequent) investments.
Liberal commons settings include forms where the initial entry can range
along a spectrum from involuntary to voluntary. For example, the classic
involuntary forms are when heirs inherit property or when neighbors are locked
into a riparian regime for stream use. By contrast, voluntary forms include any
time people choose to enter into a property institution such as a marriage or
condominium. Cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit become increasingly
problematic when entry is involuntary because it infringes more severely upon
individual freedom of choice. As we shift along the spectrum towards voluntary
entry, more intrusive cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit may nevertheless
be consistent with liberal values.172

Cf. Green, supra note 63, at 178-79 (discussing “principles of justice in dissolution,
conditioned by the legitimate expectations of the member”). Attempts to unjustly
deprivation others can be initiated either by the majority or by the minority (or one
individual commoner). In the former case, preventing unjust deprivation not only serves
as an anti-opportunistic device, but also is crucial to securing practical (and not merely
theoretical) exit. See id. In the latter case, preventing unjust deprivation s a f e g u a r d s
against independent exploiters who want to take the money and run.
171
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Several readers have suggested to us that the voluntary/involu ntary divide is
more fundamental even than we believe. They argue that the ex ante expected level of
cooperation among involuntary commoners is much lower than that of voluntary
commoners. They deduce from this reasonable premise that involuntary forms of commons
should not presumptively include our ambitious apparatus for supporting cooperation.
Instead, one should expect cooperation to fail, and let failure take its course without
intervention. They also deduce, on the other end of the spectrum, by analogy to contract
theory, that if people enter freely, law should not be concerned with arrangements that
severely curtail exit. In this account, we are committing a sort of “exit-fetishism.” Cf. Scott
& Scott, supra note 112, at 1233, 1245-47 (by elevating the freedom to renege on a promise,
no-fault divorce undermines cooperation and inadequately protects asymmetric and
specialized investment in the relationship).
Although we agree that involuntary commoners are likely to be less inclined towards
pursuing cooperative goals, we disagree with both deductions readers have drawn. As to
involuntary commoners, our point is not to force cooperation, but to support it if they want
to give it a chance. Preserving exit in such cases ensures that our apparatus does not
coerce, but facilitates an otherwise remote likelihood of cooperation. Indeed, if failure is
(continued...)
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Similarly, liberal commons settings include forms in which the “intensity”
of membership ranges along a spectrum from limited to comprehensive. Thus,
there are some forms – such as close corporations and condominiums – where
the common interest is relatively limited, so that the commoners preserve many
other areas of individual control. Other forms are more comprehensive or
inclusive – think of marriage – so that the sharing covers significant aspects of the
commoners’ lives. Cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit become
increasingly problematic when membership is inclusive (like with involuntary
forms above) because it infringes more severely upon individual freedom of
choice. As we shift along the spectrum back towards limited intensity, more and
more intrusive cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit may nevertheless be
consistent with liberal values.
c. Alienation v. Dissolution. When is dissolution even necessary to
preserve liberal exit, that is, when is a right of alienation not enough? Another
way of posing the problem is to ask when should a departing individual be able
to break up the commons? For some liberal commons forms, such as the
condominium or perhaps the cooperative, sale may be a sufficient protection for
liberal exit, and the repertoire of alienation restraints we discuss below is enough
to protect cooperation values. In these cases, particularly where cooperation is
based more on voluntary entry, a liberal commons does not require allowing the
possibility of dissolution that has both community-destruction and a privatebenefit destruction effects.173 Often, however, sale does not sufficiently protect
exit, because it can be expected to under-value the pro rata ownership share of

172

(...continued)
likely ex ante, one might understand cooperation, the failure to exit, as an affi r m a t i v e
decision to remain (though, admittedly, a contextual decision not to exit does not require
affirmative action and is therefore less weighty perhaps than an initial decision to enter into
cooperative resource management). We see no reason to make the choice of cooperation
more difficult for initially involuntary commoners by requiring that they exit and reenter to
gain the benefit of cooperation-facilitating rules.
On the second deduction, recall our distinction between ordinary contracts and
property arrangements, discussed supra note 77. For ordinary contracts, liberal values do
not reject strong lock-ins. But property arrangements that encompass much more of an
individual’s resources and social life are different. Regarding these latter arrangements –
our sole focus here – a liberal commitment to choice can not reasonably be exhausted by
an initial election of an illiberal exit rule.
173

The private-benefit destruction effect may arise in cases where one (or some) of
the commoners developed private benefits related to her share in the commons (benefits
that are not shared by everyone or not shared equally).
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the exiter. This undervaluation is increasingly likely and significant as the noneconomic benefits of cooperation, and the role of participatory management,
become more central to the commons resource, such as in many cases of
commons resource management.
d. Three Mechanisms.
1. Cooling Off Periods. An unlimited right to exit can threaten
cooperation and efficiency by generating a domino effect, a problem especially
severe because of the asymmetrical information inherent in the decision to exit.
Insights from cognitive psychology help refine this seemingly unequivocal
conclusion. In game-theoretic terms, they teach us that when people repeat
interactions, they typically may come to view their relationship as if it were of
endless or unknown duration, a conception that can lead them to switch to
voluntary cooperation. Even when the horizon is definite, cooperation may be
possible so long as the horizon is distant enough. The domino effect, with
defection as a dominant strategy, operates only for certain short time horizon
games.174
The cognitive psychology finding suggests that law can provide a useful
role in facilitating cooperation and efficiency by allowing temporary restraints on
exit. Limited restraints on alienation and on rights to call for dissolution can help
create a brief “grace period” that may be enough to lead to mutual long-term
cooperation. This marginal compromise on exit, allowing parties to lock
themselves in a commons for a time, may help lead them to adopt a strategy of
Tit-for-Tat which fully “rational” parties would adopt only in indefinite games.
And once cooperation begins, it will arguably yield social and efficiency gains
that would, as we have seen, support the parties’ continued trust and
cooperation. Hence, tweaking exit may turn the tide against the pessimistic
scenario of the tragedy of the commons and build momentum towards the types
of successful cooperation that can carry the day. 175

See M ARTIN J. OSBORNE & A RIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME T HEORY § 8.2
(1994). As an aside, recall that in all these cases, the norms of well-socialized commoners
can override law-created incentives.
174

Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 112, at 1283 (a cooling-off period “reduces the risk
of asymmetric investment” by reducing the ris k of strategic exits or threats of exit, and
encourages the parties to invest in the relationship even where the expected reciprocity is
long-term). Some may object to our reliance on people’s irrationality as a means for driving
the right outcome, suggesting that our solution offends transparency, which is another
important liberal value, and – even more importantly – is disrespectful of people. But both
(continued...)
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In most, if not all, cases, a cooling off period corresponds to, rather than
undermine, our liberal commitments, because it helps ensure a decision to exit
that is informed and sincere. A cooling off period gives more time for the
benefits of cooperation to be perceived and allows transitory emotions to cool.
Even if at the end exit still occurs, the cooling off period allows a departing
exploiter – namely: an insincere exiter – to be more readily caught and compelled
to disgorge unjust profits.
2. Exit Taxes. If prohibitive, exit taxes are incompatible with our liberal
commitments, in part because they can thwart the desires of commoners who
want to flee majority exploitation. But if reasonable, exit taxes can serve as an
important cooperation-enhancing device, as well as ensure that the exiter’s
decision is informed and sincere. The dividing line between the prohibitive and
the reasonable is imprecise, but by no means arbitrary. Exit taxes are reasonable
and thus legitimate if they serve either a protective function or a deterrence
function, but only up to a point.
As a protective device, exit taxes ensure that people will not decide to
exit too casually and help protect innocent commoners from the potential harm
caused by one member’s exit. In this role, exit taxes should monetize the
destructive effects of exit, targeting, in the alienation example, the costs of
recruitment and socialization of a replacement commoner who can effectively
replace the exiter (including the associated monitoring costs), and in the
dissolution case ameliorating the costs of community break-up.
As a deterrence device, exit taxes should set a limit on incentives to
defect, thus deterring opportunistic departure.176 In this context, an arguably
appropriate measure (balancing administrative costs against potential underdeterrence) is the present value of the benefits to the exiter that the commoners
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(...continued)
of these objections must be wrong. People’s cognitive biases do not necessarily disappear
if they are exposed, and thus there is no need to conceal the law’s reliance on these
failures. Further, there is no reason to think of such deviations from the rational-actor
model in derogatory terms. Some of the most rewarding goods of life cannot and should
not be reduced to the market rationality. See generally A NDERSON, supra note 112, ch. 7
(discussing the ethical limitations of market rationality).
176

One concern with exit taxes is that, by increasing the incentive needed before exit
becomes rational, they may induce opportunists to exploit even more to justify their costs
on exit. If so, then exit taxes would not ameliorate, but rather exacerbate exploitation. But
by pushing potential such exploiters to being so greedy, exit taxes can also significantly
increase the likelihood of detection. This effect is likely to (at least) counterbalance the
concern of exacerbating exploitation.

[Sept. 11, 2000]

THE LIBERAL COMMONS

55

conferred assuming that the exiter would remain in a long-term relationship with
the commons resource.177 Restitution of such non-cash benefits does not violate
liberal commitments to free choice if, but only if, these benefits were willingly
accepted by the member, or can be easily reduced into wealth. 178
A problem may arise even if exit taxes are appropriately set to address
either the protective or deterrence functions. A correctly set exit tax may
nevertheless have the effect of practically locking members into their current
communities. In such case, there is an unavoidable choice between the
commitment to enhance cooperation and the liberal value of preserving exit. We
would lean towards a more cautious attitude, by which we mean one that
requires both justification under the protective or deterrence rationales and
assurance that members can leave.179
3. Rights of First Refusal. Rights of first refusal may represent another
modest limitation on exit aimed at facilitating cooperation. 180 For alienation, such
rights target the commoners’ often reasonable concern regarding the possibility
of undesirable entrants:181 Rights of first refusal allow the group some degree
of control over the identity of future transferees of the current commoners. More
importantly, these rights provide a mechanism for preventing the entry of nonSee generally Hanoch Dagan, Encroachments: Between Private and Public, in
T HE COMPARATIVE LAW OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT (David Johnston & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., forthcoming 2000) (arguing that restitution of benefits is the appropriate
measure for deterring infringements).
177

See Dagan & White, supra note 137, at 387-89; contra Rosen, supra note 72, at
1101. Rosen’s only stipulation on this matter is that, “Rules requiring disgorgement of
particular economic benefits allocated to the community member on the assumption that
he or she would be a lifetime member should be presumptively valid to the extent such
provisions do not make exit an impossibility.” Id. Our approach above is more careful
about autonomy.
178
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Ideally, exit taxes should be calibrated in utility terms, which requires that they
take into account wealth disparities. In some settings this fine-tuning may prove, however,
to be too cumbersome from an administrative standpoint.
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The conventional wisdom has long been that these rights have, at most, a minimal
effect on property value because they do not impede alienation. See, e.g., 3 ERIC M ILLS
HOLMES , CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11.3, at 484-85 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1996).
Recent work, though, suggests that, because of high search and negotiation costs of
bidding on unique property subject to first refusal rights, alienation (and hence owner exit)
may be significantly burdened. See David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal,
5 STAN. J. LAW , BUS . & FIN. (forthcoming 2000).
See McKean, supra note 4, at 263 (noting that successful commons regimes tend
to have careful eligibility screening for individual households).
181
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cooperative parties as well as for preventing exploitation by exiters who may be
motivated either by spite or by the possibility of side payments from remaining
members to ensure cooperative replacements.
Regarding dissolution, rights of first refusal may be an effective means of
preserving community where a subset of members resist breaking up the
community and are willing to buy out the party seeking exit. To preserve exit,
given such a buy-out right, the price should be set according to the fair market
value of the exiter’s share (minus the exit taxes, if they apply) if the commons
resource were dissolved.182
*

*

*

The three spheres of a liberal commons work together, as Figure 1,
below, summarizes. The sphere of individual dominion provides antiopportunism mechanisms that can yield economic and social gains over private
property. The sphere of democratic self-governance can make voice effective
by facilitating trust and participation, thus allowing dynamic, satisfying, and
prosperous management of the commons resource. Finally, well-calibrated
cooperation-enhancing exit can build momentum for continuity in communities
while preserving individual autonomy. At least in theory. The next Part examines
whether the liberal commons template helps understand one case study in law
and practice.

182

A s an aside, rights of first refusal may raise issues of discrimination, when existing
insiders restrict entry, but these issues are better policed through familiar antidiscrimination mechanisms we discussed above.
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FIGURE 1: A Theory of The Liberal Commons

A. Identifying the Goals
1. Preserving the
Liberal Value of Exit

Recognize the link between exit and autonomy
Accept reasonable limits on entry

2. Achieving Gains
From Cooperation

Maximize economic gains from pooling
Strengthen the social values from cooperation
Make context-dependent tradeoffs in cases of conflict

3. Using Law as Safety
Net To Catalyze Trust

Recognize the limits of direct legal control
Deploy law to strengthen social norms

B. The Three Spheres of a Liberal Commons
1. The Sphere of
Individual Dominion

Create defaults that deter opportunistic over-use
Avoid free-riding and under-investment
Encourage fair division of fruits and revenues

2. The Sphere of
Democratic
Self-Governance

Police jurisdictional boundaries
Build procedures that facilitate voice
Promote tailor-made, resource-specific adjustments

3. The Sphere of
CooperationEnhancing Exit

Deter opportunistic destruction of the commons
Allow limited community interventions to exit

III. TRAGIC CHOICE IN AMERICAN CO-O WNERSHIP
Modern property law is a story of introducing and refining new liberal
commons types, from versions of the close corporation to the condominium all
the way to the law of marital property, with each variant spelling out default
settings for the three spheres of action, and then encouraging experimentation
and custom-tailoring. Even old-fashioned law has pockets of highly articulated
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solutions to the problems of shared ownership, usually regimes addressed to
particular natural resources, such as riparian law regarding running water, or
unitization rules for oil fields.183 While our future work will show how the liberal
commons helps make sense of numerous legal institutions,184 here we explore a
fraught story drawn from old-fashioned default rules, rules that have proven
poorly tailored to liberal commons goals.
The hostile default American law of co-ownership invites tragedy: it
undermines cooperation even when co-owners seek to work together,
encourages distrust and mis-use that may delay or even prevent use of emerging
resources, and, more generally, imposes enduring losses whenever strategic
behaviors or transaction costs deter people from voluntarily adopting a moretailored liberal commons form. We force people to choose between laboriously
contracting for their own liberal commons or suffering under existing background
rules that encourage conflict, mismanagement, and division. Property law can do
better.
The decline in black rural landownership detailed in the first section
forms the backdrop for our case study. The second section shows that the
American law of co-ownership incorporates choices in each sphere of action that
disfavor effective commons ownership. For each choice the American law
makes, we counterpose choices made by other developed legal systems that are
more supportive of liberal commons goals. Seen from this global perspective,
the American system is an outlier on a spectrum. The decline in black
landownership that has frequently been understood as an inevitable result of the
workings of ownership and management of commons resources, may instead be,
in some part, the contingent result of discrete legal choices.
A. The Disappearance of Black Rural Landowners
As an initial caveat, this section does not make any of several possible
claims regarding declining black farmland ownership. First, we do not claim, or
believe, that the law of co-ownership accounts, in a strong sense, for declining
black ownership rates. Rather, we suspect that in a regression analysis, farm size
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These default forms include not only co-ownership, but also, for example, riparian
ownership for neighbors along running streams. J OHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W . JOHNSON,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 407 (3d ed. 1989).
The next two articles in this series will be Dagan, et. al, supra note 59 and Heller
& Hills, supra note 60.
184

[Sept. 11, 2000]

THE LIBERAL COMMONS

59

would explain statistically most of the decline: similar-sized white-owned farms
and solely-owned black farms have also largely disappeared. Second, and
related, we do not claim that comprehensive reform of co-ownership law if made
in previous generations would have operated directly to preserve black farms.
The effects of poverty and race discrimination have been such that black farmers
would likely have been done out their land (by loan sharks and other scam
artists) even if the law of co-ownership were more favorable. Third, we do not
claim that any individual legal change makes a difference for potential black
farmers. Given our view of how law operates to affect behavior, farmers are
unlikely to act on, or even be aware of, any discrete law reform.
Instead, we raise the black land case in a more tentative spirit, meant to
illustrate how the liberal commons approach helps frame new questions, provoke
research, and suggest attractive reforms. The case study provides a backdrop
for, and gives some texture to the evaluation of, the law reforms we discuss in the
following section. While no individual law reform seems likely to have mattered
in this example, collectively the package of reforms we propose may have made
some difference. Had the law been supportive of cooperation in the spirit of the
liberal commons, its behavioral and expressive effects might have helped in
changing the outcome for at least some black farm families, those who wanted
to maintain their farms but were driven off by the unintended consequences of
bad law.
1. The Rise and Fall of Heir Property. – Consider a common tale of
commons property: in 1887, John Brown, a black man, bought 80 acres of land
in Rankin County, Mississippi; in 1935, he died intestate, leaving his wife and
children as heirs who in turn also died intestate, leaving the land to their children
and grandchildren. 185 One of these grandchildren, Willie Brown, began
consolidating ownership in the land by buying the interests of five of John’s nine
children: Frances, Minnie, Adda, Joe, and Lizzie. By the time Willie died, he had
accumulated an undivided 41/72nd interest, which he left to his wife Ruth. In
1978, Ruth filed for partition in kind of the farm, asking that her interest be
physically separated from the remainder held by sixty-six other Brown heirs,

See T HE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, T HE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK RURAL
LAND T ENURE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 283-286 (1984)
[hereinafter HEIR PROPERTY]. See generally, Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction
to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence and
Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common (Unpublished Ll.m. thesis,
University of Wisconsin, 1999) (manuscript on file with authors) (discussing role of
partition sales in declining black farmland ownership and collecting sources).
185
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whose interests ranged from 1/18th down to 1/19,440th of the farm.186 The
court, however, ordered the land partitioned by sale with the proceeds divided
among the heirs.187 At the sale, a white-owned lumber company outbid Ruth.188
Ruth got some cash, more than she was willing or able to pay, but less perhaps
than she would have demanded to compensate her for the farm’s subjective
value, for its role in preserving her family’s cohesion and traditions. Just after the
Civil War, when John Brown bought his 80 acres, black landownership in
America began a steep rise. Nearly a century later, Ruth Brown lost her family
land and black landownership has nearly disappeared.
The uprooting of landed heirs is an oft-repeated tale in black America,
particularly in the rural south. 189 From 1920 to 1978, the number of blackoperated farms in the US dropped 94 percent from almost 1 million to just over
5,000; by comparison, white-operated farms dropped 56 percent from about
5.5 million to 2.4 million.190 In absolute terms, there are fewer than 18,000 black
farmers in America today, less than 1 percent of American farmers, and blacks
continue to abandon farms at a rate three times that of whites.191 Why? Leave
aside racial discrimination and wealth effects for the moment, factors that matter
in this story and to which we will return.192 Some scholarly explanations for the
HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 284-86 (listing heirs’ interests and reproducing
the Brown family tree).
186

187

Id. at 283.

188

Id.

S e e BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 45. 85 percent of all black farmers are
concentrated in the south, but they are rare even there, totaling only about 6 percent of
southern farmers. Id.
189

See id. at 2-3. More precisely, between 1959 and 1969, the number of b l a c k
commercial farm operators declined by 84 percent by contrast with a 26 percent decline in
the white farm population. See id., at 40. Between 1970 and 1980, the black farm population
dropped 65 percent, compared with a 22 percent among whites. See id., at 44. For state-bystate data on declining black landownership, see US. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OFFICE
OF M INORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, LAND AND M INORITY ENTERPRISE: T HE CRISIS AND THE
OPPORTUNITY, (June 30, 1976). For a county-by-county breakdown of black landownership
in the south, see ROBERT S. BROWNE, ONLY SIX M ILLION A CRES : T HE DECLINE OF BLACK
OWNED LAND IN THE RURAL SOUTH App. Q-W (1973).
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15,000 Black Farmers File Claims in Racial Settlement, NYT, Sept. 21, 1999, at
A25 [hereinafter Settlement]; s ee also , BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 44 (Of America’s
six million farm residents in 1982, 4 percent were black.).
191
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Settlement, supra note 191, 203, at A25 (discussing decades of routine
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precipitous decline of black landownership have focused on the role of partition
sales, which are the background legal mechanism governing disposition of coowned land in the Brown family saga.193 Over a quarter of remaining blackowned land in the southeast is now “heir property” averaging eight co-owners,
five of whom live outside the southeast.194 By 1986, “more Mississippi land
[was] owned by blacks in Chicago than by blacks in Mississippi.”195 As one
study concludes, partition laws, “are unquestionably the judicial method by which
most heir property is lost.”196
Heir property is just co-owned property arguably rendered ungovernable
because of repeated rounds of intestate succession, a particular issue for
southern rural black landowners with “superstitions about making wills,”197 but
no desire to have their family farmland broken up or sold. In general, when a
landowner dies intestate (that is, without a will), the heirs at law receive fractional
undivided interests in the land. For example, each of John Brown’s nine children
received a 1/9th undivided interest in the 80 acres. Often, this first generation of
heirs successfully manages their parents’ property, but second and third
generations multiply quickly and prove less and less able collectively to cope.198
Over time, practical problems become unresolvable. Under the
American law of co-ownership, unless fractional owners unanimously consent,
the underlying land cannot practically be managed in any useful way, nor can it
be mortgaged, nor can any discrete fraction of the land be sold. Without
effective democratic self-governance mechanisms for co-owned property, “heir
property is rarely improved or developed, due to the threat of partition sales and
the difficulty of obtaining credit on partial interests in the property. ‘In fact, a third
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(...continued)
discrimination by the Agriculture Department in denying crucial loans to black farmers).
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See, e.g., HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 282; Mitchell, supra note 185, at 4-7.
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HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 62.
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Ward Sinclair, Black Farmers: A Dying Minority, W ASH POST , Feb. 18, 1986, at

A1.
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HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 282.

Joseph Brooks, The Emergency Land Fund: A Rural Land Retention and
Development Model in T HE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER – ENDANGERED SPECIES 117, 121
(1979).
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See HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 282-83; see generally BROWNE, supra note
190, at 54. Governance difficulties are compounded because identifying heirs with legal
interests becomes a more complex and expensive project with each passing generation. Id.
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more heir than non-heir property is not being used at all.’”199 Thus, “[t]he sale of
the land, usually precipitated by a heir who is more than one generation removed
from the originating source, becomes inevitable.”200
2. Community-Destroying Exit. – What are the paths by which black
landownership ends? First, as with the Brown example, resident heirs may bring
suit to quiet title intending to acquire ownership in severalty of part of the farm.201
By seeking a partition in kind, these heirs express their preference to stay on the
land and to gain access to mortgages and other ordinary incidents of sole private
ownership.202 Despite the heir’s request, and the law’s nominal preference for
partition in kind, courts usually order a partition sale because the number of heirs
and limited size of the property makes physical division impracticable.203 The
second, more sinister, path to partition sales originates with non-resident heirs.
A non-family member may acquire a distant non-resident heir’s fractional share
in a family farm specifically for the purpose of forcing a partition sale at which the
outsider can buy the whole tract.204 Because heir property is very common
among rural blacks, “the black community is particularly vulnerable to the
unscrupulous partition sale brought about by someone buying out the interest of
a single heir and then demanding that the land be sold.”205
Partition sales, like foreclosure and tax sales, prove to be poor, often
rigged markets with little information and few buyers: “The purchasers at these
[partition] and tax sales are almost always white persons, frequently local
lawyers or relatives of the local officials, who make it their business to keep
abreast of what properties are going to auction and who attend the auctions
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BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 68.
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HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 282-283.
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See BROWNE, supra note 190, at 54.
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As an aside, filing suit often turns out to be a significant strategic error based on
the mistaken belief by most southern rural black landowners (according to surveys) that
“an heir’s interest cannot be sold without the consent of all the heirs, and that heirs in
possession of the land have superior rights to the land.” B LACK FARMING, supra note 1,
at 69 (reporting survey of black landowners).
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Even when partition in kind is possible and perhaps even practical, court favor
partition sales. See 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERT Y ¶ 612 (Rohan ed. 1998)[hereinafter
POWELL].
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See BROWNE, supra note 190, at 55.

205

Brooks, supra note 197, at 121.
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prepared to buy.”206 Given wealth disparities, widespread discrimination in
access to credit for rural black households, and the ordinary imperfections of
these rural auctions, partition sales in practice mean the transfer of the land from
resident black heirs with fractional interests to white purchasers who often pay
below market value and pay nothing for the farm’s intangible value in preserving
family cohesion.207
Farming, from all reports, is a chancy business. If cashing out simply
improves blacks’ overall position and consolidates economically obsolete
farms,208 then the decline in black landownership may not be a serious problem,
notwithstanding the congressional studies209 and private initiatives210 concerned
with halting this trend. However, declining black landownership also can be
traced in part perhaps to the difficulty of governing fractionated land, resulting in
partition sales initiated either by resident heirs seeking to improve land
management or by non-resident heirs and their purchasers seeking to acquire the
whole farm at bargain prices. 211 The hostility of American law towards coSee BROWNE, supra note 190, at 55. Indeed, these bidders may well be the people
who induced the action for partition. Id.
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207

Criticizing the prevalence of forced partition sales, one note argues that judges
have “misapplied the statutes and allowed private interests to use the statutory process
as a land acquisition tool at the expense of cotenant landowners.” John G. Casagrande, Jr.,
Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27
B.C. L. REV. 755, 772 (1986).
208

The average commercial black owned farm in the sou th is 128 acres, while the
average white owned farm is 428 acres. B LACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 50. “Economies
of scale, research and technology, tax benefits, government price and income supports, and
commercial lending all militate against the survival of black-operated small farms.” Id.
See BLACK FARMING, supra note 1; Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-577, § 509, 92 Stat. 2114.
209
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The most significant private initiative is the Emergency Land Fund, a private, nonprofit organization founded in 1971 to counter black land loss. See Brooks, supra note 197,
at 117.
211

There are incentives outside of property law that also encourage partition. For
example, attorney fee structures often award lawyers 10 percent of th e l a n d v a l u e o n
partition sale, but not if the title problem is informally resolved. There are many stories of
lawyers who have initiated partition suits for heirs over the objection of the heirs’ families.
In one case, a New York heir asked her lawyer to provide deeds to the family property, but
the lawyer instead filed an action for sale and partition. When the heir fired the lawyer, the
lawyer then found another heir to prosecute the suit. See HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185,
at 292-93. Also, the tax system encourages partition sales by favoring wealthy investors
(continued...)
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ownership appears to impose several costs, not only on individual black families,
but perhaps on farm communities more broadly.212
Landownership provides benefits other than just farm income.
Commoners may prefer not to sell because they identify alternative, economic
uses or they place a high subjective value on keeping the land in the family. For
example, one study of a rural North Carolina community showed how
landownership provides reciprocal benefits within black families; older owners
can obligate children by allowing them to settle on the land, the children then
provide support for the elderly landowner in this residential enclave.213 By
contrast, the study notes, landless elderly people prove less able to mobilize
informal support and suffer lower living standards.214 Along with simple
economic reasons, there may also be cognitive framing issues for sales: a farm
might stay in the family because they would not be “willing to accept” the market
price; but if forced to bid at auction, that same family might only be “willing to
pay” a lower amount and thus lose the farm.215 Finally, when commoners do
decide to sell non-economic farms, they only get distressed prices for individual
share sales or at partition auctions. They could do better by marketing the
property cooperatively, but if the law facilitated cooperation, then they might not
want to sell in the first instance.216
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(...continued)
who can write off certain losses in ways not available to low or moderate income farmers.
See BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 4.
See, e.g., William E. Nelson, Jr., Black Rural Land Decline and Political Power,
in Brooks , supra note 197, at 83, 93 (“The absence of a viable equity base has been costly
to the black community both economically and politically. Black dependency on white
economic support has served to rob the black community of its autonomous decisionmaking potential.”).
212

See Lisa Groger, Tied to Each Other Through Ties to the Land: Informal Support
of Black Elders in a Southern U.S. Community, 7 J. CROSS-CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 205,
205, 210 (1992).
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Id. at 205, 217; see also Lisa A. Kelly , Race and Place: Geographic and
Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw Era , 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 243 n.56 (1996).
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This phenomenon of cognitive psychology was hypothesized by Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 669 (1979). Later studies confirmed the effect. Loss-aversion may at least partially
explain this difference. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and t h e
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS . S251, S258 (1986).
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Perhaps locking people together by preventing alienation, the no-exit illiberal
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We cannot know how much of the sharp decline of black landownership
should be attributed to race and class discrimination, or to market forces that
make small farms uneconomical. However, it seems plausible that, at least on
the margin, some of this decline might have resulted from a particular default legal
regime that does not support commons ownership and instead actively
undermines any possibility for its success, even when the family deeply desires
to continue working together, to keep land in the family, and to give family
members a fair share when they leave.
B. How Law Can Dissolve Tragic Choice
The American law of co-ownership shrinks from any attempt to facilitate
management of co-owned resources. Instead, by providing incentives for
mismanagement, the default rules of the common law make the continuing
existence of a commons a risky enterprise for commoners (technically, usually
co-tenants).217 Over time and in many ways, the American law of co-ownership
dilutes the value of interests in commons property, making them less and less
usable for the commoners. Combined, the rules promote under-use, over-use,
and under-investment – anything but the actions of an ordinary sole owner
managing one’s own property. Given the penalty default legal regime of the
common law, the tragedy of the commons turns out to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
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(...continued)
solution, would have kept some more farms within the family. But such a solution, even
if it achieved community-preserving goals, would still be tragic, because it sacrifices each
heir’s liberty to exit. Further, we question whether preventing alienability would
necessarily achieve even instrumental community-building goals. Consider the disastrous
consequences of federal allotment policy for Native Americans which locked people
together without providing effective internal self-governance mechanisms. See Heller,
supra note 51, at 1213-17 (discuss ing tragedy of the anticommons resulting from these
policies).
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Co-tenants are those who share land under the common law regime of tenancy in
common. Each individual tenant has an interest in the same piece of property that has
undivided. Unlike joint tenants, there is no right of survivorship among co-tenants. See
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 321-34. In all states where it existed, the presumption
in favor of joint tenancy has been abolished, id. at 323, so on death and in the absence of
a will, heirs hold property as tenants in common. Abolishing the presumption of joint
tenancy, thus, may have had the unintended effect of accelerating fractionation.
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By contrast, Continental legal regimes do a better job of supporting the
goals of a liberal commons, although some fall short in significant ways. Legal
regimes which descend more from the French side of the tradition (i.e., France,
Belgium, and the American state of Louisiana) diverge in a few places from those
on the German side (i.e., Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and in this context
Israel). One of these divergences – the requirement of unanimity in democratic
self-governance – marks the French tradition a significantly less supportive than
its Germanic counterpart. But viewed broadly, Continental legal systems possess
most of the features we identified as supporting the liberal commons: facilitating
the flourishing of the common use of property while still allowing meaningful exit.
Even those Continental legal systems of the French tradition which carry the
uncomfortable baggage of unanimity (creating the conditions for anticommons
tragedy), are still considerably more supportive of the liberal commons than the
American law. Even England, America’s common law parent recently passed
a law reform that significantly aligns its law with liberal commons goals.
The differences between the American and Continental laws of coownership are quite tedious (and we have relegated some details to footnotes).
But, over time, it is just the collective impact of those tedious details (which
follow) that shape the norms of communities of co-owners, and tilt co-owners’
attempts to cooperate towards success or failure. Whether something more like
the Continental law would have made a difference for the black landowner is
difficult to guess in retrospect. Perhaps not. And no single change would likely
have made any difference. The decline may have been over-determined, with
racism in lending and changes in technology dwarfing subtle changes in the formal
law. There is no way now to tease out the causal links between formal law and
the informal norms and practices among black farm families and surrounding
communities.
Nevertheless, the possibility that European farm families can now stay
more easily on their land when family members depart, suggests at least a
testable proposition. Perhaps, the formal law matters occasionally even in rural
farm communities and operates as the liberal commons theory predicts. Whether
German farm families respond to supportive co-ownership law (or whether
regression modeling would point wholly to government price supports218), then
becomes an interesting question for fieldwork and empirical testing. For

See, e.g., Alison Maitland, Shrewd farmers see the way the wind is blowing, FIN.
T IMES , Mar. 17, 1998, at 2 (discussing German farmers’ support for extensive price
subsidies).
218
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emerging and “new economy” resources today, perhaps a default co-ownership
law supportive of the liberal commons could be even more important in
catalyzing a virtuous circle of trust and cooperation.
1. The Sphere of Individual Dominion. –
a. American Law.
The common law facilitates a race to over-use; the classic image of a
tragedy of the commons. Each commoner is entitled to full possession and, more
importantly in most states, can possess and use the commons without paying any
rental value to the non-possessors219 (so long as the non-possessors are not
excluded or ousted from possession).220 These rules provide a incentive for
overuse because each commoner must make affirmative uses, or else receive no
rents from the resource.221
In the farm context, the common law incentives for under-investment are
probably much more salient. As an initial matter, the law is relatively receptive
to claims for accounting or contribution for payments of taxes, mortgages, and
other necessary charges made by one commoner on behalf of the others.222 But
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7 at 351, 51 A.L.R.2d 383 (1952); cf. 2
A MERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 219, at § 6.14, at 57 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) [hereinafter
ALP]. There are, however, jurisdictions which have adopted other rules. For example,
some jurisdictions have statutes that specifically require tenants in possession to
compensate non-possessory commoners for the value, usually calculated as the nonpossessing tenant’s proportionate share of rent, as if the property were rented to a third
party. S e e Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of
Commoner Possession Value Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 W IS . L.
REV. 331, 351 (1994); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET . AL, T HE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.18, at 214
(2d ed., 1993) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM]. Other jurisdictions hold the duty to account
applicable whenever a commoner derives any income from the sole possession of the
property in the form of rents or otherwise. See id. at § 5.18, 213.
219

220

See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 219, at § 5.18, 211.

221

In theory, but not in practice, the law of waste might penalize a cotenant for overuse, such as clear-cutting timber from property today if the timber would be more valuable
in later years. While the law of waste is designed to avoid property usage that fails to
maximize the property’s value, the law is sufficiently confused and the penalties sufficiently
light that overuse is encouraged. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF LAW
73 (4th ed. 1992). Courts are very divided over the question of whether cutting timber or
drilling for oil (activities that on the appropriate scale the law may well want to encourage)
constitute waste. See 2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.15, 65.
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 359; 2 ALP, supra note 219, at §6.17,
73-74. Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted a rule that if the tenant who paid taxes
is in possession and the value of their u s e and enjoyment equals or exceeds such payment,
222
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if one commoner makes necessary repairs without the others’ consent, most
courts are much less forthcoming, allowing the investing commoner to receive
contribution only at partition, or through a setoff in the (rare) case where a court
requires an investing commoner to account for rents and profits.223 This rule has
been rationalized as necessary because questions “of how much should be
expended on repairs, their character and extent, and whether as a matter of
business judgment such expenditures are justified” are too uncertain for the law
to settle.224 Thus, commoners who make repairs take a significant risk that they
will not be reimbursed; alternatively, they are led to partition as the only available
avenue to recoup their investment expenditures.225

(...continued)
then there is no cause of action for contribution. See 2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.17, 76;
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 359. This modification, however, is itself not
uniformly applied. See 51 A.L.R..2d., supra note 219, at 455-59.
223

On the complex, conflicting, and multifarious approaches to co-tenants and
repairs, consult 2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.18, 80; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 219, at § 5.9,
215; 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, T HE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.7, 430 (1978); DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 7, at 359; Berger, supra note 145, at 1019-20; John P. Dawson, The SelfServing Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1422-23 (1974).
It may appear at first sight that the doctrine of ouster provides a background rule
of strict accounting. An action for ejectment restores possession to an ousted plaintiff and
awards the plaintiff mesne profits, with an offset for necessary repairs (and perhaps some
improvements, if profits are attributable to them). See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 219, at §
5.8, 212, 214. Ouster, however, requires an express denial of another cotenant’s right to
entry and possession. The doctrine provides no remedy for a cotenant who is in
possession or who is voluntarily not in possession. See id., at § 5.8, 211; 2 ALP, supra
note 219, at § 6.13, 52-54. Furthermore, there is a presumption that one cotenant’s
possession (even if sole possession) is not adverse to other cotenants. See 7 POWELL,
supra note 203, at § 50.03(2); 51 A.L.R.2d 388, § 13, at 437 (1957). Thus, ouster doctrine
provides a recourse in only a limited set of circumstances and may be costly or difficult to
prove even then.
224
225

2 ALP, supra note 219, at §6.17, 78.

To complete the picture, one should mention the common law rules regarding
improvements. Co-tenants who make improvements on the property are generally unable
to bring an action for contribution, nor are they credited the cost of the improvement in an
accounting for rents and profits. See 2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.18, 81; Dawson, supra
note 223, at 1424. The only recourse available for tenants to recover their investment is
partition. See Dawson, supra note 223, at 1425; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 360.
Nevertheless, even with partition, the valuation of improvements discourages such
expenditures. The majority rule is that improving co-tenants are entitled to the lesser of the
cost of the improvement or the additional increase in property value. See PALMER, supra
(continued...)
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b. Comparative Perspective. The Continental traditions have
desirable rules for discouraging both over-use and under-investment. To avoid
over-use, Israel (and Louisiana) make the user liable to the other co-owners for
the cost of use.226 Further, countries in the Continental traditions distribute the
net fruits and revenues of the property on the basis of the commoners’ shares
in the property, thus helping both to discourage overuse and to inculcate a sense
of community among the commoners.227 Likewise, Germany and Israel require
immediate reimbursement for expenses reasonably required for maintenance and
management of the commons resource, while denying compensation for
improvements (whose value is less clearly shared by all commoners).228 This
relatively broad provision for immediate reimbursement for non-contestable
(reasonable) collective goods bestowed upon the land discourages the sort of
under-investment that can make common ownership inefficient. Furthermore,

225

(...continued)
note 223, at § 10.7, 429; 2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.18, 83. Some courts even say that
credits for improvements can only off-set additional moneys owed and cannot be a source
of income. See Dawson, supra note 223, at 1425-26.
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LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE Art. 806; ISRAEL LAND LAW § 33.
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Section 35 of the Israel Land Law provides that, “Every joint owner is entitled to
a share in the proceeds of the joint property in accordance with his share in the property.”
In the Yotzer case, the court declined to give this passage a narrowing interpretation that
would have applied it only to situations in which the proceeds are due to no one owner’s
labor, or even adopting our complex intermediate approach. C.A. 274/82 Yotzer v. Yotzer,
P.D. 29(1) 53, 55-56. For similar rules in Germany and Austria see GERMAN CIVIL CODE §
743(1); A USTRIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 839; Karsten Schmidt, in M ÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, § 743, 7 (3rd ed. 1997); Langhein, supra note 229, at § 743, 10,
11. In a unique case, a German court allocated 100% of profits from advertising to one coowner of a gable wall who had allowed his side of the wall to be used for these purposes.
43 BGHZ 127, 133-34 (1965). This outcome has been explained by the fact that, although
a gable wall is jointly owned, each side is intended to be used exclusively by one owner.
See Langhein, supra note 229, at § 743, 12.
For Germany, see BGH, W ERTPAPIER-M ITTEILUNGEN 196-97 (1975), interpreting §
748 of the German Civil Code (Ian S. Forrester, et al., trans., 1975) (“Each participant is
bound as against the other participants to bear the burdens of the common object and the
costs of maintenance, management, and common u s e in proportion to his share.”); see also
Langhein, supra note 229, at § 748, 19 (no compensation for improvements). This rule also
governs in Israel. See ISRAEL LAND LAW §§ 31, 32. Interestingly, the Swiss law, which
generally follows the German Continental tradition, seems more like the American in this
aspect, only granting the co-owner the right to “take on his own the necessary steps which
have be taken without loss of time in order to preserve the object from imminent or
increasing damage.” S WISS CIVIL CODE Art. 647.
228
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such a regime of instantaneous contribution assumes that dissolution is not a
satisfying first-best solution, but should be indeed a solution of last resort.229
2. The Sphere of Democratic Self-Governance. –
a. American Law. One commentator aptly notes, “co-tenant conflicts
are for the most part hidden dramas.”230 Co-owned property in the American
common law is governed by a rule of unanimity – each commoner has veto
power over the decisions of the other commoners regarding property
management. A leading text notes, “[i]f the co-tenants cannot agree neither law
nor equity can settle such difference; nor can they specifically settle how the
property shall be used and enjoyed. The law’s remedy in all such cases is

229

The Continental tradition also prohib its individuals from making use of the
resource in a manner that interferes with the reasonable use of other co-owners. See
FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815-9; GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 743(2); A USTRIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 828;
SWISS CIVIL CODE Art. 648 (1); ISRAEL LAND LAW § 31; LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE Art. 802. They
employ flexible guidelines to restrict use to what may have reasonably been expected by
the other commoners, typically by reference to the nature of the property and its previous
uses. Of course, the United States law and other regimes that we generally consider less
supportive of the liberal commons also prohibit such interfering use. The salient difference
in this area comes in the details of how this prohibition is implemented. Of particular
importance is the rule adopted when joint u s e is impossible or unreasonable. In such a
situation, where similar u s e by both would be impossible, can one party then use the
property to the exclusion of the other? As we have seen, American law allows this
inconsistent use, encouraging the parties to enter into a strategic game where each seeks
to be the one allowed to exclude the others, behavior inconsistent with the idea of
productive cooperation. Forbidding such use, on the other hand, encourages the parties
to reach a cooperative and efficient solution (such as by rental to a third party). Providing
an incentive for such a solution is the supportive approach to take to encouraging a liberal
commons. German law provides just such a supportive approach: use by one owner is
allowed only when it does not interfere with the use of other owners. See Gerd-Hinrich
Langhein, in J. VON STUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, § 743, 38
(13th ed. 1996). If joint use is impossible, the disposition of the property must be
determined by the agreement of all of the commoners; if this is impossible, a majority vote
may determine the u s e of the property and compensation for the benefits of this use must
be paid to the non-using owners. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 745 (3) 2. Swiss law is similar
in this regard. See Arthur Meier-Hayoz, in BERNER KOMMENTAR , vol. IV. 1, Art. 648, 17-23
(Swiss provision). Israeli law is unsettled on this matter, with one Justice favoring the
unsupportive American approach and another favoring the supportive rule. See Vilner v.
Golani, P.D. 42(1) 49. Justice Ben-Porat favors the American approach while Justice
Netanyahu favors the supportive approach.
230

Lewis, supra note 219, at 351.
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partition.”231 For example, if differences arise among commoners regarding
whether to jointly enter into a transaction – such as borrowing money against the
property or leasing it to outsiders – the law does not provide any guidance or
facilitation. Absent partition, the veto power each commoner enjoys leads to a
tragedy of the anticommons, with wasteful under-use and eventual division as
demonstrated by the black landownership saga.
Given these doctrines, it is unsurprising that, “[m]ost lending institutions
will not lend money on a partial interest in real property, even if the exact amount
of the partial interest is known.”232 Thus, a commoner can not get a mortgage
on an individual fractional interest; and, as a group, unanimity rules prevent
commoners from easily combining to get a mortgage on the whole. Without
access to finance – a missing market – the sum of the parts proves less than the
value of the whole.233
b. Comparative Perspective. Focusing on the Germanic legal regimes,
at the supportive end of the Continental spectrum, the most important way they
support the liberal commons, by contrast with the American common law, is by
granting a wide jurisdiction for majority rule in the sphere of self-governance,
reserving a relatively small sphere for unanimity.234 However, the threshold
German tradition sets between majority rule and unanimity is more restrictive
than the threshold our theoretical discussion would suggest. We recommended
that majority rule should be available for decisions that tend to increase the size
of the pie; and unanimity ought to be required when decisions merely redistribute
within a same-sized pie. Instead, Germanic legal systems draw the distinction
based on the expectations of the parties. Majority rule is allowed when the
decisions do not change the parties’ expectations for how the property will be

231

2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.18, 78.

232

HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 185, at 306.

233

The inablity of commoners to borrow against the property provides a large
incentive for parties to partition.
234

Not all Continental legal traditions have adopted this supportive rule: in general,
those countries who are more closely related to German law have majority rule; while the
legal traditions more closely related to France share the less desirable American
requirement of unanimity. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815-3; BELGIUM CIVIL CODE Art.
577bis § 6. See also Louisiana Civil Code, Art. 801, 803; Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole
Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 T UL. L. REV. 69, 131-32
(1993) (preference for partition as the solution where unanimity cannot be reached). As an
aside, Kazakhstan also required unanimity as a general rule. K AZAKHSTAN CIVIL CODE §§
212, 213.
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used; unanimity is required for decisions that depart significantly from these
expectations.235
One may speculate that this rule is based on the concern of risks of
courts’ errors in complicated disputes as to the utility of conflicting uses. We
appreciate this concern. Nevertheless, we believe that adopting such a
conservative attitude towards the scope of the majority rule may suffocate the
ability of the commons to adapt and grow with changing times. Interestingly
enough, Swiss law incorporates our reservation into the expectations-based test
by closely scrutinizing the distribution of the benefits of such majority
decisions.236
Procedural norms of democratic self-governance also distinguish
relatively supportive Continental traditions for liberal commons property regimes
from the less supportive American law.237 Both jurisdictional and procedural

235

German law itself allows for majority rule for decisions “corresponding to the
character of the common object,” but requires unanimity for “essential alteration[s] of the
object.” GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 228, at § 745. Israeli law is essentially the same.
Israel Land Law § 30(a) (majority rule for “all matters relating to the ordinary manner and
use); § 30(c) (unanimity required for other matters); C.A. 810/82 Zol Bo Ltd. v. Zeida, P.D.
37(4) 737. Austrian and Swiss law, with minor alterations, have the same system.
A USTRIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 833 (majority rule for ordinary management and use); Art. 834835 (in the absence of unanimity for significant alterations, dissenters may make specific
demands or refer the matter to a judge). SWISS CIVIL CODE Art. 647a-d (majority rule for
most administrative acts, useful and necessary repairs); Art. 647e (unanimity required for
improvements merely to improve beauty or comfort. Other Continental countries also
provide for majority rule in approximately these situations. ITALIAN CIVIL CODE §§ 11051106, 1108; GREEK CIVIL CODE Art. 789, 792-93; HUNGARIAN CIVIL CODE §§ 140, 144 (majority
for issues “not exceeding standard measures,” unanimity for others); CZECH REPUBLIC CIVIL
CODE § 139 (majority for all decisions with the ability to appeal to the court to reconsider
important decisions); JAPAN CIVIL CODE Art. 251, 252 (majority by value fo r a c t s o f
administration, unanimous for alterations).
236

For instance, if the agreed-upon alteration requires an unfair contribution by one
commoner (for example, paying 1/4, but getting 1/10 of the value, etc.) who voted against
the contribution, then that commoner must be compensated. S WISS CIVIL CODE Art. 647d.
237

Germany provides each co-owner a right to “adequate” participation in the
decision-making process, which includes access to adequate information, and a right that
each co-owner’s opinion be taken adequately into account. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 744
(1), § 242; Schmidt, supra note 227, at §§ 744, 745, 16, Langhein, supra note 229, at § 745,
20. In Israel, there are requirements of disclosure and consultation, C.A. 810/82 Zol Bo Ltd.
v. Zeida, P.D. 37(4) 737, as well as requirements that parties approach the consultation open
to suggestions. Violations of these requirements voids the majority decision. See C.A.
458/82 Vilner v. Golani, P.D. 42(1) 49.
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norms help make the participation in systems of majority governance more
meaningful.
3. The Sphere of Cooperation-Enhancing Exit. –
a. American Law. How to manage the freedom to exit poses a
challenge for the liberal commons. In this sphere, the American and Continental
laws have substantial overlap, with a mixed record and few cooperationenhancing mechanisms. For example, both have similar provisions regarding
restraints on alienation of co-owned interests, and the choice between partition
by sale and partition in kind. In the American law, the limited mechanisms for
cooperation-enhancing exit must be voluntarily agreed in advance by the coowners. For example, agreements by co-owners not to partition are generally
enforceable so long as they do not amount to a restraint on alienation and are for
a reasonable time (which can turn out to be quite a long period, indeed).238 On
the other hand, the American law disfavors agreements to restrain sale of coownership interests,239 so co-owners are, in general, unable to block sales to
outsiders.
Partition is the dominant exit mechanism.240 Nominally, partition in kind
is the preferred common law method,241 but it is complex to implement when coowners can not agree voluntarily on division. To even out shares, courts impose
equitable adjustments, such as payments of “owelty” or easements among the

238

W ILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE C. W HITMAN, T HE LAW OF PROPERTY 216-217 (3d
ed. 2000) (noting that typically a reasonable time is defined as being a time within the rule
against perpetuities period); CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 183, at 114; 2 ALP, supra note
219, at § 6.26, 116. The waivability of the right to call for partition proves to be one of the
central features that distinguishes co-ownership from condominium law in general. Unlike
co-ownership, condominium statutes or agreements prohibit calls by unit owners partition
of the co-owned elements; so exit is by sale of the unit only. See STOEBUCK & W HITMAN,
id., at 181, 217.
239

See STOEBUCK & W HITMAN, supra note 238, at 178 & n.19.

But not during the earliest days of the tenancy in common form. See CRIBBET &
JOHNSON, supra note 183, at 127 (noting that at early common law, only coparceners, but
not tenants-in-common, had the right to demand partition).
240

See Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in Kind: A Preference Without Favor, 7
CARDOZO L. REV. 855, 856 (1986); 2 ALP, supra note 219, at § 6.26 114; Ashley v. Baker, 867
P.2d 792 (Alaska 1994) (placing financial interests of co-owners at center of decision
whether to partition by sale or in kind); Von Behren v. Oberg, 902 S.W.2d 338 (MO.1995)
(same).
241
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new parcels.242 Physical division often proves impossible for a minority of the
commoners, or significantly diminishes the value of their shares. In most cases
now, partition is by sale with the proceeds distributed pro rata according to
ownership shares.243 However, as we have seen, auction sales often result in
opportunistic exploitation by one commoner, because the auctions are such poor
markets. While the choice between partition in kind and by sale may be
complex – driven by “personhood”244 or utilitarian concerns – neither seems
well-tailored by itself to achieving cooperation-enhancing exit.
Some reforms have been attempted. For example, Alabama passed a
statute that gave co-owners the right to purchase the interests of the co-owner
who petitioned for partition (but this provision was struck down in 1985).245
Other states allow courts to order a partial partition, thus respecting the desires
of those who wish to remain in co-tenancy. 246 Both of these reforms seem aimed
at ameliorating the community-destroying effect of the current law of partition.
But they are not careful enough about their distributive effects. The former
reform offers an even thinner market than does auction sales. The latter – the
procedure of “partial partition” – is also problematic. Allowing a subset of the
commoners to carve out a share by physical division absent general consent is
likely to injure the remaining commoners who may be left with a larger share of
a smaller and less valuable piece of property. Hence, both reforms may
exacerbate the potential minority oppression of current law and thus
paradoxically undermine cooperation.

STOEBUCK & W HITMAN, supra note 238, at 215 (defining owelty); Eli v. Eli, 557
N.W.2d (S.D.1997) (remanding for application of rules of owelty and creation of easements
to ensure equitable partition in kind).
242

243

See POWELL, supra note 203, at ¶ 612; STOEBUCK & W HITMAN, supra note 238, at

221-224.
See generally DAGAN, supra note 127, at 41-47; M ARGARET JANE RADIN, Property
and Personhood, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35 (1993); JEREMY W ALDRON, T HE RIGHT
TO P RIVATE P ROPERTY 343-389 (1988). In the recent case of Eli v. Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405
(S.D.1997), the court noted how partition in kind should trump monetary considerations
especially when “the land in question has descended from generation to generation.” Id.
at 410.
244

See Ala. Code § 35-6-100; Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 2d 150 (Ala.1985) (holding the
statute violated equal protection provision of the federal and state constitution).
245

See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-16 (1998); Idaho Code § 6-509 (1998); Tenn. Code §
29-27-104 (1998); Utah Code § 78-39-9 (1998).
246

[Sept. 11, 2000]

THE LIBERAL COMMONS

75

Perhaps one direction for a more successful reform would be to give
commoners supporting and opposing partition a period of time to secure a sale
on the open market, with the partition auction as a backstop. Or, adapted from
the law of condominiums, co-owners who wish to remain on the land following
an auction could be given limited rights of first refusal (also called preemption
rights).247
b. Comparative Perspective. The countries in the Continental tradition
generally provide for the right both to alienate one’s share in the property and to
call for partition of it.248 Commons success is enhanced, however, by allowing
a cooling-off period, namely: enforcing party agreements that restrain exit (both
in the sense of alienation of one’s share and also in the sense of partition) for a
limited time period. This is generally accomplished by declaring the complete
invalidity of agreements that exceed a certain number of years, or by subjecting
the restraint after a limited period of time to the broad discretion of the court.249
Some provisions of the Germanic systems relating to agreements to
restrain exit go too far, in our view, in supporting the flourishing of the commons,
threatening the liberal premises upon which desirable commons regimes are

See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 183, at 130 (discussing rights of first refusal
as a mechanism for condominium owners as mechanismto preserve community); STOEBUCK
& W HITMAN, supra note 183, at 123-24, 182, 203 (same).
247

See, e.g., GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 747 (alienation), § 749 (1) (partition); ISRAEL LAND
LAW § 34(a) (alienation), § 37(a) (partition); A USTRIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 827 (alienation), Art.
830 (partition); SWISS CIVIL CODE Art. 646(3) (alienation); Art. 650(1) (partition); LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE Art. 805 (alienation); FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815 (partition); BELGIUM CIVIL
CODE Art. 815 (partition).
The French law allows for a court-ordered delay of the exercise of this right for a
maximum of two years if immediate partition would depreciate the value of the property.
FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815. If used too frequently, this provision could represent a
troubling inroad on the availability of exit. But used sparingly, and for such a limited
period, it may be an acceptable compromise between the parties’ interests in preserving the
value of their property and their right to exit.
Note that countries who did not provide generally for the right to partition without
court approval are excluded from this comparative discussion. See infra note 254.
248

249

In Louisiana, parties may agree to restrain alienation and partition for a period of
fifteen years. LA. REV. STAT . 9:1112. In Israel, the time limitation for agreements restraining
alienation is five years. Israel Land Law § 34(b). Many Continental regimes limit
agreements to restrain partition to five years. BELGIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 815 (5 years);
FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815 (5 years). Japan also does so. J APAN CIVIL CODE Art. 255 (5
years); In Israel, the time limit on agreements restraining partition is left to the discretion
of the court – after three years, the court may order partition despite the agreement if the
court deems it just to do so. I SRAEL LAND LAW § 37(b).
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based. For instance, German law allows agreements to restrain alienation of
one’s share to last perpetually, not mitigated by the authority of any court to
invalidate the agreement,250 as exists in German partition agreements.251 The
Swiss law places a thirty-year time limit on the validity of agreements to restrain
partition, but this time limit is arguably excessive.252 The only limits Austria
places on agreements to restrain partition is termination upon transfer of the
property. 253 In their desire to support common ownership, some of the countries
in this tradition have failed to adequately provide for the relatively free exit that
is essential to the functioning of a liberal commons.254

250

GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 747 provides the general right to alienate one’s share, which
may not be excluded by any juristic act, § 137 c.1.
251

German law allows agreements to restrain partition to remain in force indefinitely,
subject to invalidation by the court for “serious cause.” GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 749(2). This
provision seems to contemplate the possibility of permanent agre ements to restrain
partition in some circumstances. German Civil Code § 749, 751 (referring to the power to
exclude “permanently”). Such restrictions even potentially outlast transfers of the
property. GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 751. Although this criteria at first sounds like it may be
too rigorous and too great a restraint on exit – a requirement of “serious cause” sounds
much more restrictive than the broad discretion sometimes placed in courts to invalidate
agreements – there is reason to believe that it is not, in fact, applied so rigidly in Germany.
In particular, counterbalancing the concern that such an agreement will unduly burden the
parties’ ability to exit, is the likelihood that a restraint on partition that lasts for an
“unreasonably” long time, along with other causes that approximate concerns about
restriction on exit, will count as sufficient “serious cause”. See Schmidt, supra note 227,
at § 749, 8. Other causes for invalidating these agreements include violation of the
minority’s procedural rights in decision-making or a breakdown in the personal relations
of the commoners, Langhein, supra note 229, at § 745, 20; Schmidt, supra note 227, at §
749, 11 (3rd ed. 1997), and hostility between the commoners such that joint u s e is
impossible. BGH, in NEUE JURITSCHE W OCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHINGS -REPORT 334, 335
(1995). Conversely, a good opportunity to sell the common property is generally not
considered a good cause. See Schmidt, supra note 227, at § 749, 11.
252

SWISS CIVIL CODE Art. 650(2). Hungary is even more protective of exit, disallowing
agreements restraining partition altogether. H UNGARIAN CIVIL CODE § 147.
A USTRIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 831. See also Art. 832 (a third party disposition of
property in common can bind the first parties to the disposition, but not their heirs). A
similar regime is in place in India, where agreements in perpetuity are allowed, but they
have been held not to bind heirs, on the grounds of public policy concerns with alienation
of land. S HAMBHUDAS M ITRA, M ITRA’S CO-OWNERSHIP AND PARTITION 173-174 (1994).
253

254

There are, of course, much more extreme examples of sacrificing the “liberal”
aspect of the liberal commons by placing serious barriers to exit. For instance, several
Middle Eastern countries do not have an express right to partition. In Iran, partition is not
(continued...)
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How partition is accomplished is also important to support a liberal
commons. Countries in the Continental tradition use two ways to pursue the
injunction of distributive exactness: scrupulously fair distribution of the value of
the property on partition. Like the American law, most favor partition in kind255
(unless this form of division would seriously compromise the value of the
property distributed to the parties256). Accordingly, these countries pay careful
attention to ensuring that each party gets a fair share using the mechanism of
owelty payments.257 Another approach, used by Germany, is to limit partition
in kind to situations where physical partition can lead to distributively exact
values going to each owner. Germany provides further security against the
possibility that the physical portions will be unfairly divided by prescribing that
after division is made, distribution of the parts is made by lot.258 “Partial
partition” is allowed only when the commoners provide unanimous consent.259
Our discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of rights of first
refusal suggested that providing such a right as a default may benefit a liberal

254

(...continued)
available if it leads to a loss in value of the land. IRAN CIVIL CODE Art. 595.1. In Jordan,
partition may only be had by means of a petition to the court which, presumably, may be
rejected. JORDAN CIVIL CODE § 1040. In Nigeria, as well, partition of jointly owned family
land – where “family” appears to be defined quite broadly – is only available for cause,
and, when deciding whether or not to partition, the court must consider “the best interest
of the family as a whole”. T ASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS , NIGERIAN LAND LAW 126-127 (1971).
255

A USTRIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 843; SWISS CIVIL CODE Art. 651(3); ISRAEL LAND LAW
§§ 39, 40; C.A.1017/97 Ridlevitch v. Moda’i (Israel).
See supra note 255. This is also the law in many other countries. S ee
KAZAKHSTAN CIVIL CODE Art. 218; HUNGARIAN CIVIL CODE § 148; CZECH REPUBLIC CIVIL
CODE § 142; JAPAN CIVIL CODE Art. 258; VIETNAM CIVIL CODE § 238; M ITRA, supra note 253,
at 375 (India). Interestingly, England effectively has the reverse presumption, where
partition by sale is much easier to effect than partition in kind. See infra text accompanying
note 265.
256

257

SWISS CIVIL CODE Art. 651(3); BELGIAN CIVIL CODE Art. 833; ISRAEL LAND LAW §
39(b); FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815. This is also the law in Kazakhstan, KAZAKHSTAN CIVIL
CODE § 218(3).
258
259

GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 752.

C.A. 623/71 Gan-Boas v. Englarder, P.D. 27(1) 334 (Israel). For the law in Germany,
see Schmidt, supra note 227, at § 749, 25; Langhein, supra note 229, at § 749, 53.
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commons regime. French law provides for a right of first refusal, as do many
other legal systems, although the Germanic countries do not.260
4. A Final Comparison: The British Turn. – The American law of coownership took its lead from the English common law.261 So, where does
England stand? Until recently, the English law was uniquely unsupportive of coowned property. 262 Not surprisingly, when the American law of co-ownership
260

FRENCH CIVIL CODE Art. 815-14. The right of first refusal is relatively common, and
appears in many legal systems. K AZAKHSTAN CIVIL CODE Art. 216; CZECH REPUBLIC CIVIL
CODE § 140; VIETNAM CIVIL CODE Art. 237; CHINA CIVIL CODE Art. 78 (right of preemption
“if all other conditions are equal”); M ITRA, supra note 253, at 95-97 (India).
261

To understand the relevant English law, first note some unique structural features
of English Land Law. Interests in land are divided into legal interests (strictly speaking,
ownership) and equitable interests (strictly speaking, various rights of use and control).
English law does not allow for legal interests to take the form of a “tenancy in common” –
the type of commons property we are considering here. Law of Property Act of 1925
(LPA), § 1(6). (It does, however, allow for these interests to be held as a joint tenancy,
which differs from a tenancy in common mainly in respect to the existence of survivorship
rights.) S IR ROBERT M EGARRY & M. P. T HOMPSON, M EGARRY’S M ANUAL OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 288 (7th ed. 1993); E.H. BURN, CHESHIRE AND BURN’S M ODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 225 (15th ed. 1994); KEVIN GREY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 512 (2 nd ed. 1994).
Because of this restriction, all commons property must technically be held as equitable
interests, and not as legal ownership. Because ownership is just a collection of equitable
interests – various rights of u s e and control – the restriction could have bee n m e r e l y
formal, for land registration purposes. One person could have owned the legal title but be
made powerless regarding equitable interests, and the co-owners could split the equitable
rights between them much as they are in other systems. But the formal restriction on legal
commons property has had a more profound effect on jointly held equitable interests in
property.
262

In the English system, commons property at law is provided for by means of a
trust. The trustees (no more than four, per the Trustee Act of 1925, § 34) are empowered
to make decisions abou t managing and disposing of the property, but are bound by
various requirements of consultation and potential judicial overrides. One of the main
reasons for requiring that common ownership be in trust was that a small group of trustees
were thought more able to facilitate the alienation of the land than a potentially larger group
of common owners. And the trust structure did indeed have that effect, particularly
regarding alienation. A potential purchaser need not investigate all of the interests in
common property, and must only deal with the trustees. M EGARRY & T HOMPSON, supra
note 261, at 291-92. Before 1996, the trust itself was referred to as a “trust for sale” and the
trustees were under a statutory duty to sell the property at the earliest convenience. Id.
at 289. Under the equitable doctrine of conversion, a beneficiary was considered to have
an interest only in the proceeds of the sale of the co-owned property, and not the land
itself, as equity regarded as done that which ought to be done (in this case, sale). Id. at
257-58. Trustees could postpone sale, but only if they all agreed to do so (even one trustee
(continued...)
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was formed, it followed the British preference for ending co-ownership rather
than supporting its continuation, even if the two systems did not use the same
technical forms.263 In 1996, however, England passed the Trusts of Land and
Appointment of Trustees Act (TLATA), moving England significantly closer to
a supportive regime. The details are complex, but, in some ways, the English law
now surpasses its American progeny in supporting the goals of a successful
liberal commons.264
Despite these changes, English law still does not go as far as the
Continental systems. To give one example, immediate contribution is not
available, even for basic maintenance and other necessary expenses;265 and as

262

(...continued)
favoring sale was enough to trigger the duty). Id. at 289. Furthermore, alienation of the
property was also facilitated by the power of two trustees to validly sell the land to a bona
fide purchaser, overreaching the equitable interests of the co-owners of the property. LPA
§ 2(1)(ii), 27(2). The only major exception to the duty to sell came for property which, like
the family home, had a “purpose” other than sale, and this development came rather far
along in the history of the law. See Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd. v. Boland [1981], AC 487;
BURN, supra note 261, at 236-37. The preference for sale, and the ease with which sale can
be accomplished, demonstrates the degree to which the common law considered commons
property to be pathological – an arrangement to be ended as quickly as possible.
263

Interestingly, American law rejected the common law view of the sale of the
undivided property as the primary means of ending commons property and instead focused
on the right to partition, a much more standard approach globally. Because of its focus on
alienating the undivided property, common law actually made it more difficult to obtain
partition than its continental counterparts. This effectively results in an incentive to
partition by sale (without consent of the parties) rather than in kind. Under the present
English law, partition of the property by the trustees requires the consent of all of the
beneficiaries, a task much more difficult than eliminating their interests in the co-owned
land through sale and then distributing the proceeds. TLATA § 7.
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The trust structure has been maintained, but its ingrained preference for sale has
been significantly eroded. The automatic duty to sell and the equitable doctrine of
conversion have both been abolished. TLATA § 3(3) (abolishing the doctrine of
conversion); TLATA § 5(1) (abolishing the duty to sell). And, although two trustees can
still sell the property to a bona fide purchaser and thus override the equitable interests of
the co-beneficiaries, LP A §§ 2(1)(ii), 27(2); TLATA § 8(2), the co-beneficiaries are now
empowered to petition the court to stop such a sale. TLATA § 14. Also, the TLATA adds
some procedural norms that enable greater participants by non-trustees, such as the
requirement that, if practicable, the beneficiaries of the trust must be consulted and the
wishes of the majority followed, at least insofar as these coincide with the general interest
of the trust. TLATA § 11.
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Leigh v. Dickeson [1884-1885] 15 QBD 60. See also GREY, supra note 261, at 479.
(continued...)
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we have argued, delaying such recovery until dissolution increases incentives for
ending common ownership. On balance, though, England has moved
substantially towards greater support of a liberal commons regime, and has left
American law behind.
The American law of co-ownership shows what happens when people
are faced with a particularly hostile legal regime, one that assumes shared
management can not work, and then interposes law that guarantees failure and
partition. It may be too late to reverse the tide for black rural landowners, too
few are left, and the legacy of discrimination weighs too heavily. But the lessons
of their experience have wide applicability everywhere along the frontiers of
property – cyberspace, genetic research, environmental conservation –
anywhere people want and need to work together, but each individual
reasonably fears exploitation by the others.266 While the American law of coownership now fails, it can do better; the liberal commons points the way.
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(...continued)
To give another example, agreements to restrain partition and alienation are allowed, but
only if they are a part of the initial instru ment, and the two trustees may override the
agreement by selling the land to a bona fide purchaser for value. TLATA § 8. These
trustee powers decrease the effectiveness of non-partition and non-alienation agreements
as tools to enable long-term cooperation. Also, the trustees themselves must be
unanimous in exercising their powers, Luke v. South Kensington Hotel Co. [1879], 11 Ch.
D. 121, 125, which can make governance of the commons more difficult.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability 53 VAND. L. REV. 1162 (2000):
The artist, starving in a garret; the dedicated scientist, experimenting in a garage;
the reclusive professor, burning midnight oil in the office – these are becoming
endangered species. The creative industries have evolved: collaborative
production is replacing individual effort. . . . [Yet,] the intellectual property
literature has focused so little on the special problems of collaborative work. . . .
Allocating the incidents of ownership is not a part of the "mental furniture" of
many collaborators; left on their own, parties can and do run into sig n i f i c a n t
difficulties. . . . Redesigning the intellectual property system to take explicit
account of collaborative production would have significant a d v a n t a g e s .
Well-designed rules reduce transaction costs by functioning as off-the-shelf
arrangements or starting points for ex ante negotiations. They also serve ex post,
as default rules for situations in which the parties discover that they have omitted
key terms from their agreements.
Id. at 1162-67. These and similar examples give us confidence that the liberal commons
construct will have wide scope for further theoretical development and useful application.
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CODA
Any liberal commons regime must grapple with the three spheres of
action necessary to manage a commons resource: the spheres of individual
dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit. Only
by addressing all three spheres successfully can a liberal commons help people
achieve the goals of preserving liberal exit while promoting the economic and
social gains from cooperation. Sympathizers of privatization and communitarian
approaches have seen conflict where there can be – and in a global perspective,
often is – harmony. All have overlooked the facilitative role that law can play in
overcoming tragic choice, in particular by using law to help catalyze and inculcate
the social norms that make a liberal commons into a viable, indeed ordinary, way
to own property. More and more, as “sole despotic dominion” fades from
economic life, versions of a liberal commons are becoming the dominant forms
of ownership, though a form that has not yet been recognized and studied in a
unified way. The metaphor of the “tragedy of the commons” has blocked legal
imagination and innovation; beyond tragedy, there are liberal commons solutions.

